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Executive Summary 
In recent years, China has been in the spotlight for its determination to develop a 
relatively unexpected industry within its boundaries, football. The idea was introduced by 
the current President of the People’s Republic of China, Mr Xi Jinping, who intends to 
turn China into a top football nation. This is rather surprising considering that China has 
never been successful in football and has also never had a domestic football star. Thus, 
the Chinese government, the Chinese Football Association and local clubs have 
launched several considerable projects and concluded deals where large amounts of 
money were involved in order to help develop football in China.  
The Chinese large financial investments in football have made the headlines of many 
newspapers, notably The Financial Times and The Economist. These investments have 
led the football community to wonder whether the development of football in China is 
worthwhile. Many football professionals mainly criticised the lack of investments in 
grassroots of Chinese football and the surplus of money paid by Chinese clubs to attract 
foreign football players. Hence, this study aims to analyse the Chinese football business 
model and compare it with other nations’ football business models to see if Chinese 
financial investments in football are reasonable.  
It is shown later in this document that the Chinese financial investments in football are 
actually guided by a well thought-out strategy. Chinese are surely financially investing a 
lot but when compared to other nations, Chinese financial investments in football are far 
from excessive. In addition, the Chinese Football Association and some Chinese football 
clubs have succeeded to build a strong network with top football nations and clubs in 
order to improve their knowledge in the sport. 
The main challenge for the Chinese leaders of the national football project will be to 
create a football culture in China, which is essential if they want their country to succeed 
in this sport. The Chinese government, businesses, and national football association are 
already financing many projects to positively influence the growth of a football culture 
within the country. Nonetheless, a football culture cannot simply be bought and 
consequently results that are expected from this spending are not immediate. 
The main recommendation for the Chinese authorities involved in the national football 
project is to keep investing in football youth development while controlling overspending. 
In addition, they need to remain patient in order to see emerging generations of local 
football stars that will have benefited from the investments currently being made.   
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1. Introduction  
In 2011, Xi Jinping, Vice President of the People’s Republic of China at that time, made 
a big announcement about his willingness to develop football in China (Timmons, 2016). 
He stated three main goals, which were “to qualify for the World Cup, host the World 
Cup, and win the World Cup” (Wan, 2015). This was very ambitious considering the 
Chinese national team’s previous performances in football. Indeed, Team China1 only 
qualified once for the FIFA2 World Cup in 2002 and the country does not seem to have 
much of a chance of qualifying for the next FIFA World Cup in Russia. After the first half 
of the group stage matches of the Qualifiers, Team China positioned itself at the end of 
the table in its group with zero wins and only two draws (FIFA (C), 2017). In the February 
2017 FIFA/Coca-Cola Men’s World Ranking, China (1.37 billion people) was situated at 
the 86th place, between Qatar (2.26 million people) and Kenya (44.79 million people) 
(FIFA (D), 2017 & CIA, 2016).   
Football is considered a “painful national joke” in China (The Economist, 2011). 
Therefore, it is legitimate to wonder why Mr Xi is so determined to develop this sport in 
his country. Football development in China is in fact part of a national project to reinforce 
the national sports industry. Indeed, as the Chinese GDP growth rate has more than 
halved from 14.23% in 2007 to 6.91% in 2015, the government of China is looking for a 
boost for its economy in the service and entertainment industries, notably the sports 
industry (Sha, 2016 & The World Bank (B), 2017). In 2013, the Chinese sports industry 
was worth 1.09 trillion Yuan (€ 148.3 billion3) and contributed to 0.63% of the Chinese 
GDP with an added value of 356.4 billion Yuan (€ 48.5 billion) (Xinhua (A), 2016). A 
press release, published on the website of the State Council of the People’s Republic of 
China, announced in 2016 that the national sports industry should reach a market value 
of more than 3 trillion Yuan (€ 408.3 billion) by the end of 2020 (Xinhua (D), 2016). The 
Chinese sports industry will then account for 1% of the national GDP with an estimated 
added value of 900 billion Yuan (€ 122.5 billion). In comparison, the US and European 
sports industry were estimated to represent 2% of their respective GDP, accounting 
respectively for about US$ 360.7 billion (€ 326.1 billion) and US$ 326.3 billion (€ 295 
billion) in 2015 (Sha, 2016, European Commission, 2014, The World Bank (A), 2017). 
Within the Chinese sports development project, football is the sport that is expected to 
                                                
1 The name of the Chinese national team 
2 Fédération International de Football Association, the highest governing body of international football 
3 For a better comparison, all prices are converted into Euro (€) on the average of the 2016 exchange rates 
found on X-rates.com. 
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grow the most. Until now, football in China has been lagging behind but the sport has 
the potential to contribute more to the Chinese economy. For example, the English 
Premier League (EPL)4 contributed £3.36 billion (€ 4.1 billion) to the UK GDP during the 
season 2013/14 (EY, 2015). Thus, football alone accounted for about 0.2% of the overall 
UK GDP (ONS, 2017). On top of that, the EPL generated £2.4 billion (€ 2.9 billion) as 
tax receipts during the same season and employed 103,354 people. With about 21.3 
times more people and a land area around 38.5 times larger than the UK, football can 
turn into a very lucrative industry in China (CIA, 2016). 
The two main stakeholders that are driving the football development project in China are 
the Chinese government and local businesses. The Chinese State plays more a role of 
an influencer whereas Chinese businesses provide the financial support to help develop 
football in China. However, these two stakeholders are driven by different objectives. 
The Chinese government sees football as a soft power tool and a way to increase 
patriotism whereas businesses see this sport as a way to increase their visibility and 
generate profits. Thus, the first prioritises the generation of local stars and national 
success when the latter cares more about generating profits as soon as possible, 
regardless whether profits are generated, directly or indirectly, by foreigners. Hence, the 
main challenge for the development of football in China is to find a common ground 
where achievements will satisfy these two stakeholders as well as Chinese people.   
The first objective of this study is to define the Chinese football business model by looking 
at the different types of revenues and costs generated by this sport in the country. In this 
study, the Chinese football business model is mainly compared with that of the top five 
European football nations5: England, Spain, Germany, Italy, and France. The Chinese 
football business model is also compared with the US football business model6, as the 
football industry is also growing in North America even if it is not the most popular sport. 
These comparisons help examine the Chinese football business model compared with 
its competitors and see if there are deficiencies. The second objective of this study is to 
assess the opportunities and challenges of the development of football in China in order 
to determine whether or not football can turn into a lucrative industry for the local 
economy. 
                                                
4 The highest British football league  
5 The top five European nations are the only European nations that have ever won the FIFA World Cup. The 
top-tier football leagues of these nations are also considered as the top five European football leagues and 
generate the largest revenues in football worldwide. 
6 The US football league, the Major League Soccer, includes Canadian teams  
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2. Typology of the football business model 
There are two types of competitions in football, the ones with national teams and the 
ones with clubs. However, in both cases the business model is the same. Financial 
benefits depend a lot on a team’s success on the field. Mr Stefan Szymanski, Professor 
of economics and co-author of the book Soccernomics, mentioned during his interview 
for the Case Business School: “the [football] business model works really on the basis 
that you want to succeed on the field in order to generate a bigger fan base in order to 
generate more revenue” (Szymanski, 2010). The reason is that the majority of revenues 
in football are derived from broadcasting rights and sponsorship. For example, the top 
five European leagues generated a € 5.8 billion revenue7 from broadcasting and € 3.4 
billion from sponsorship8, which corresponded respectively to 48% and 28% of the 
overall top five European leagues revenue in 2015 (Appendix 1, p.64). Moreover, the top 
five European federations generated a revenue of € 673 million from broadcasting and 
sponsorship in 2015, which represented 63% of the total revenue that the five federations 
have generated (Appendix 2, p.64).  
In terms of costs, it is slightly different between national teams and clubs. Wages is by 
far the major cost for football clubs. Salaries represented 63% of European clubs’ costs 
in 2015 with € 10.6 billion (UEFA (A), 2015). This amount was split between players, 
coaches, staff and personnel but the main part went to football players. For example, it 
can be estimated that about 55% of the top five European Leagues wages came from 
salaries paid to players (Appendix 3, p.65). On top of that, transfer fees have taken a 
bigger part of clubs’ costs since 2012. Indeed, the total spending on international 
transfers has increased from US$ 2.71 billion (€ 2.45 billion) in 2012 to US$ 4.79 billion 
(€ 4.33 billion) in 2016 (FIFA (E), 2017). On the other hand, the major expenditure of 
national teams goes to salaries of coaches, staff and personnel. The players selected in 
the national team are not always paid. If players receive money from their national team, 
they only receive bonuses. In addition, national teams do not have transfer costs.  
Hence, a football association of any country survive thanks to the revenues generated 
by its national teams and the financial contributions of its leagues. In return, a football 
association uses the money received from its national teams and clubs to pay its 
personnel and redistributes the surplus to support the development of football in its 
country.  
                                                
7 The revenue of the leagues is cumulated by their respective clubs  
8 Including commercial and merchandising  
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Every country has developed itself differently in football. To date, there is no perfect way 
to develop football in a country. Nonetheless, there are two main areas for a country to 
focus on when improving itself in football, youth development and the top-tier league. 
Improving football youth development in a country allows the production of local skilled 
football players that can play in the local leagues and possibly in the national teams. This 
will benefit more the national teams as the best players may be willing to play in a foreign 
league that is more attractive than the local league. Developing the competitiveness of 
the top-tier league of a country will attract and gather the best football players of the 
world in the league. This will be more advantageous for clubs as it will be easier for them 
to purchase the best players, not only local ones but also foreigners. A country can 
choose to develop the two areas at the same time but, by looking at the two examples 
below, it is better for a country to favour one of the two.  
The Belgium football association’s blueprint has focused more on youth development 
and the creation of a clear and standardized football philosophy within the Belgian 
national teams (James, 2014). Indeed, Mr Michel Sablon was appointed as the 
federation’s technical director after the elimination of Belgium at the 1998 FIFA World 
Cup in France in order to put in place a plan to improve performances of the Belgian 
national football team. Thanks to his plan that focused on youth development, Belgium 
has been producing football stars these last few years. This has completely changed the 
statue of Belgium in football and now the country is among the top football nations 
worldwide. Indeed, in 2009, the Belgian national team was ranked 66th in the FIFA World 
ranking, its lowest position ever, to then reach the 1st position in 2015 (Appendix 4, p.65). 
Nonetheless, the Belgian first football league was ranked in average at the 12th position 
in the UEFA ranking of European football leagues from 2002 to 2017 (UEFA (C), 2017). 
In addition, there is only RSC Anderlecht who won a European trophy in 1983 but that 
was only the UEFA Cup, which was the second-tier European cup (UEFA (D), 2017). 
Football development in England was characterised by the separation of the first division 
from the lower divisions and the creation of the Premier League in 1992 (Radnedge, 
2017). This change was financially very profitable for the clubs playing in the top-tier 
league, notably with the sale of the league’s TV rights to Sky. Thus, the EPL is now the 
football league that generates the highest revenue worldwide and is even profitable, 
which is not the case for every football league (Appendices 1 & 6, pp.64 & 66). However, 
the national team of England has not won any major title since their victory at the 1966 
FIFA World Cup (FIFA (G), 2017). In addition, the English national football team has 
been positioned in average at the 10th place of the FIFA ranking since its creation and 
its best position was 4th in 1997 (Appendix 5, p.66).  
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3. The evolution of football in China 
Before looking at the current Chinese football business model, it is interesting to look at 
the evolution of football in China in order to better understand the place that this sport 
occupies in the modern Chinese society.  
China claims to be the world’s first country to have ever played a sport similar to football 
(The Economist, 2011). “Cuju” or “kick ball” was apparently played during the Han 
dynasty in the 2nd century BC. Two teams composed of twelve men faced each other 
with the objective of throwing a ball in a single elevated net. Over time, “Cuju” 
disappeared and by the 19th century it was completely replaced by an English modern 
“Cuju”, the so-called football. This sport was presented to Chinese as a foreign sport but 
it drew attention notably from the political leaders Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping.  
Modern football in China was first fully controlled by the government but, at the beginning 
of the 1990’s, the state decided to allow corporate investments in football and let some 
Chinese football clubs work like commercial ventures (The Economist, 2011). However, 
like in any activity in China, the government kept a certain level of control. Chinese 
football stars began to earn higher salaries but still less than their counterparts in Europe. 
Football became a professional sport in China in 1994 when the Jia-A League was 
introduced (Lee & Fort, 2015). The league was led by a tough competition between clubs 
owned by state-run companies and clubs owned by private companies. The richest 
investors injected large amounts of money into their respective club in order to 
outperform competitors. At one point, investing money in football clubs was not enough 
to generate success therefore some investors started to fix games in order to satisfy their 
desire for victory.  
Match-fixing in China was also strongly pushed by gambling syndicates (The Economist, 
2011 & Lee & Fort, 2015). Eventually, scandals of match-fixing and gambling became 
public and had a negative impact on football in China. In addition, the scandals became 
more widely known just before Team China's first participation in a FIFA World Cup finals 
in 2002. The elimination of the national team without scoring a single goal was probably 
the final blow to Chinese football (FIFA (B), 2017). Many corporates decided to withdraw 
their investments and sponsorships in Chinese football clubs, which led to salary cuts for 
football players and made them even more vulnerable to gambling syndicates.  
The Chinese Football Association (CFA) decided that the league needed to be reformed 
in order to meet higher standards of professionalism and rebuild a positive image of 
football in China (The Economist, 2011 & Lee & Fort, 2015). In 2004, the Jia-A League 
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turned into the Chinese Super League (CSL). The Chinese government continued to put 
an emphasis on eradicating match fixing from Chinese football. Many players, referees 
and officials were sent to prison for match fixing (Cao & Gong, 2013). Notwithstanding, 
some clubs benefited from a favourable treatment from the CFA and this led again to 
scepticism about the integrity of the national federation. For example, Shanghai Shenhua 
FC and Tianjin Teda FC got caught in match fixing scheme, but were penalised only with 
a six points deduction from their season, instead of demotion to the second division, 
which was the typical sanction for cheating Chinese teams, like for Guangzhou FC in 
2009. People in China who criticised the way the CFA was managed were mainly 
pointing out the lack of agreement from the higher levels of administration, which could 
be explained by the fact that many high positioned people in the federation did not have 
the skills required for their position. Indeed, some of the CFA’s officials were part of the 
Chinese government bureaucracy and many of them had no idea how to oversee football 
or indeed any sport. They were part of the Chinese Football Administration only because 
of their links with the communist party and political connections.  
In 2009, new scandals of match fixing surfaced and the CSL was reformed again (The 
Economist, 2011 & Lee & Fort, 2015). Anew, many officials of the federation, the leagues 
and clubs were arrested and replaced by a new administration. This reform along with 
the Chinese economic growth financially benefited Chinese football. Indeed, for the 
growing middle class in China with higher disposable income, tickets to sporting events 
became more affordable. In addition, as Chinese companies were doing better, 
businesses that owned clubs or new entrepreneurs could inject more funds in this sport. 
One of the most noticeable examples was the takeover of Guangzhou FC by the 
Evergrande Real Estate Group. From the 1990s to 2009, this club was involved in many 
match fixing and gambling scandals, such as in the “Black Whistle” scandal9, and was 
relegated to the second division in 2009. However, three years after the takeover in 2010, 
the club went from the second division to the first place of the Chinese Super League 
and also won the Asian Football Confederation (AFC)10 Champions League in 2013, 
which is the most important football competition for clubs in Asia. The last and only time 
another Chinese club, Liaoning FC, won the Asian Champions League was in 1990 but 
that was before the competition was reformed in 2002 (Worldfootball (B), 2017). 
Guangzhou FC, which is now known as Guangzhou Evergrande Taobao FC, imposed 
itself as one of the best Asian football clubs and has won every single CSL title since 
                                                
9 Probably the biggest scandal of match-fixing in China 
10 The highest governing body of Asian football 
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2011 as well as another time the AFC Champions League in 2015 (Worldfootball (A & 
B), 2017).  
The financial investment by Jiayin Xu in Guangzhou FC not only had a positive effect on 
the club but it has also attracted other companies to invest in Chinese football clubs (The 
Economist, 2011 & Lee & Fort, 2015). Thus, R&F Properties, one of the largest real 
estates in Guangzhou as well as competitor of the Evergrande Real Estate Group, 
decided to purchase the other club of Guangzhou, Shenzhen Phoenix. The club was 
renamed Guangzhou R&F FC and created a rivalry on and off the pitch. Moreover, the 
CSL started to open its doors to foreigners and many players as well as coaches from 
other countries were integrated into Chinese football. Most of the foreign players or 
coaches were offered very competitive salaries, much higher than what they could ever 
earn in Europe. 
In 2007, the FIFA reported that 26.2 million Chinese people played football, which 
accounted for almost 10% of the total number of football players worldwide at that time 
(FIFA (B), 2007). Therefore, it is legitimate to wonder why Team China has not been 
able to form a team of eleven players that can compete in football at a world stage. Many 
theories have been advanced to explain the problem. First, Rowan Simons explained in 
his book, Bamboo Goalposts, that traditionally Chinese politics and culture went against 
team sports. For example, gatherings of more than ten people were forbidden therefore 
forming a football team was not the easiest task (Gibson, 2016). In 2011, a mid-level 
functionary in China's State security apparatus also confessed that Chinese politics 
interfered with the development of football in China. “You know all those problems with 
society that you like to blame on China's political system? Well it really is like that with 
football.” (The Economist, 2011). The Chinese government favoured more individual 
sports, like table tennis or gymnastics, and notably provided good coaches, facilities and 
travel funds for these sports which led to success in the Olympics (Tsuchiyama, 2010). 
The Economist added that, in term of opportunity costs, the Chinese government was 
more willing to invest in individuals who could win several medals in a competition 
whereas in football a team can only win a medal or a cup. The British magazine also 
calls into question the way sports talents are selected and treated in China. Indeed, 
young athletes are identified depending on their physical attributes, which can work in 
athletics, but does not necessarily work for football. In this sport, physical aspects do 
play a role but it is not the most important factor of success. For example, the current 
best player, Lionel Messi (in competition with Cristiano Ronaldo), is only about 1.70 
meters tall and is far from having the body of a Greek athlete (Transfermarkt (C), 2017). 
His predecessor, Diego Maradona, was of a similar stature with his 1.67 meters tall 
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(Transfermarkt (B), 2017). Then, as we saw previously, corruption really tarnished the 
image of football in China. Even though the Chinese government and football association 
have made a point of fighting corruption in football, some Chinese people still link football 
with the “Black Whistle” scandal and consider playing football as “da jiaqiu” (“playing fake 
ball”) (The Economist, 2011). For this reason, families do not want their child, which is 
likely to be their only one because of the Chinese one-child policy, to waste time in a 
dirty sport that may have a bad influence on him/her. Moreover, the strict Chinese 
educational system leaves little free time to enjoy extracurricular activities. Therefore, 
knowing that football is not the most popular sport in China, a majority of Chinese children 
choose another sport if they want to practice a sport in their free time. Another reason 
why young Chinese decide to practice different sports is the fact that there is a serious 
shortage of football pitches in China. Finally, the ex-manager of Guangzhou Evergrande 
Taobao FC, Lee Jang-soo, coached for a long time in China and also has his own point 
of view on why Chinese football players are not successful. He mentioned that Chinese 
players are not hard-working enough. He added that “perhaps all they think of is to 
establish good relationships with their superiors. Most clubs are like this. It's mainly about 
connections, not hard work.” (The Economist, 2011). 
Since the creation of the FIFA ranking, Team China has been positioned on average at 
the 73rd place in the world (FIFA (D), 2017). By considering only the average ranking of 
countries in the Asian Football Confederation (AFC), Team China is not even a main 
competitor in Asia, as the country is still behind the football national teams of Japan 
(34th), Korea Republic (39th), Iran (46th), Australia (49th), Saudi Arabia (54th). Team China 
is at the same level of the national team of Uzbekistan, who has also been positioned on 
average at the 73rd place, but this country has never participated in any FIFA World Cup. 
As a reminder, no Asian country has ever won a FIFA World Cup. Therefore, Xi Jinping’s 
dream to see Team China win the FIFA World Cup remains very ambitious. 
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4. The Chinese football business model  
4.1 The structure of Chinese football 
The Chinese Football Association (CFA) is the main governing body of Chinese football. 
It is supervised by the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) and more 
directly by the Asian Football Confederation (AFC). FIFA is the international governing 
body of football and AFC is in charge of supervising football in Asia (FIFA, 2016 & AFC 
(A), 2017). The CFA must “always comply with the statutes, regulations and decisions of 
FIFA” and AFC (FIFA, 2016). The CFA is headed by Cai Zhenhua, a former table tennis 
player who is also chairman of the table tennis association, badminton association, as 
well as a member of the State General Administration of Sports (AFC (B), 2017 & China 
Vitae, 2017). Mr Cai is supported by the CFA’s vice president & general secretary 
Mr Zhang Jian and six other vice presidents. The CFA is a non-profit making association 
that oversees its national teams, leagues, cups and referees, which implies that most of 
its revenue must be used to manage and develop Chinese football. This association is 
also supposed to be non-governmental but all the CFA governing members have a link 
with the Chinese government, which raises questions about the independence of the 
CFA from the State (Van de Ven, 2017). For example, the Chinese government recently 
expressed its discontent concerning the way Chinese clubs were spending large sums 
to purchase foreign players. Right after, the CFA decided to release an 18-point plan, 
reviewing its policy on foreign players just before the start of the season (Pitt-Brooke, 
2017).  
Figure 1 – The governance structure of Chinese football 
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The Chinese Super League (CSL) is the top football division in China and is headed by 
Mr Ma Chengquan (Conway & Lockwood, 2016). The CSL is a limited company under 
the umbrella of the CFA and is funded by its shareholders, the sixteen clubs under its 
direction (CSL, 2017). The top five European football leagues are also funded by their 
clubs but they have different corporate structures. The EPL, Bundesliga11, and Serie A11 
are privately held companies whereas the Ligue 111 and La Liga11 are associations 
(Companies House, 2017, Bundesliga, 2017, Lega Serie A, 2017, LFP, 2017, 
Bloomberg, 2017). Clubs either act as shareholders or members of their respective 
league. The Major League Soccer (MLS)11 is a limited liability company and clubs must 
pay a franchise to be able to play in the league (MLS, 2017).  
Chinese clubs are mainly private companies owned by one or two Chinese companies 
(Appendix 7, p.67). Some of the companies owning a Chinese club are still directly linked 
to the local government. Guangzhou Evergrande Taobao FC was the first Asian football 
club to be listed on the stock exchange market (Bland, 2015). In comparison, there are 
various types of ownership in European football. The four main sorts of club ownership 
in Europe are: privately owned by a rich investor, publicly owned by external companies, 
ownership as a majority by the club itself (minimum 51% of the club’s shares) and the 
rest of the shares acquired by external companies, and finally ownership by fans (Callow, 
2010). In the US, clubs are owned by private companies. 
 
                                                
11 Bundesliga: the top German football league, Serie A: the top Italian football league, Ligue 1: the top French 
football league, La Liga: the top Spanish football league, and MLS: the top North American football league 
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4.2 The money flow in Chinese football  
The CFA generates its revenue from its national teams, leagues and cup. This study 
focuses only on the CSL as well as Team China because there is no financial information 
available for the Chinese Football Association Cup. In addition, Team China and the CSL 
are the two largest sources of revenue of the CFA. The major part of CFA’s revenue 
comes from Team China while only ten percent of the CSL’s revenue from broadcasting 
and sponsorship is handed over to the CFA (Xinhua (C), 2016). The CSL’s revenue is 
generated by its sixteen teams. For both Team China and the CSL, their revenue comes 
mainly from broadcasting rights and sponsorship.   
The CFA must pay its personnel and staff with the revenue generated by Team China 
and the CSL. Then, the association must decide how it will redistribute the rest of its 
revenue among the national teams and local leagues. The CFA will also provide financial 
support to projects that will help the development of football in China. The CSL must also 
redistribute some of its revenue to its clubs, notably the revenue from the broadcasting 
rights of the league.  
Figure 2 – The money flow in top-tier Chinese football12  
Broadcasting rights 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sponsorship 
                                                
12 The red arrows show how the money flows in Chinese football 
16 football  
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4.3 The revenue structure of Chinese football  
4.3.1 Demand for football in China 
It is important to define the Chinese football fan base because, as mentioned before, the 
more supporters there are, the more broadcasting companies and sponsors will be 
interested to financially support Chinese football.  
China already has a large football fan base despite the fact that football is not the most 
popular sport in the country. According to Nielsen’s three years research, 31% of the 
Chinese urban population aged from sixteen to fifty-nine years old are interested in 
football (Nielsen, 2016). The most popular sports in China are basketball, table tennis, 
badminton, and swimming with respectively 40%, 37%, 36% and 34% of the urban 
population from sixteen to fifty-nine years old interested. Nonetheless, the popularity of 
football has grown steadily during the three years of studies conducted by Nielsen 
studies, which may come from the fact that the Chinese government and the CFA have 
put a lot of effort to develop this sport in China.  
By looking at the overall TV audience of the FIFA World Cup, we can see that there are 
already a lot of Chinese people willing to watch football. During the 2006 FIFA World 
Cup Germany, the number of Chinese viewers was estimated to account for almost one-
fifth of the overall FIFA World Cup’s TV audience (FIFA (A), 2007). During the 2010 FIFA 
World Cup South Africa and 2014 FIFA World Cup Brazil, the largest share of TV viewers 
came again from China with respectively 328.7 million and 252.2 million people 
reached13 (Appendices 8 & 9, p.68) (Kantar Sport, 2010 & Kantar Media, 2014). The 
decrease of Chinese viewers from 2010 to 2014 was largely due to the less favourable 
time zone of Brazil compared to South Africa for China. Notwithstanding, the number of 
Chinese TV viewers was far above other countries figures in the two World Cups 
mentioned. The second country with the largest TV audience during the two World Cups 
was Brazil with 157.5 million audience reached in 2010 and 164.6 million in 2014, 
respectively 171.1 million and 87.7 million people less than China.  
In addition, Chinese football fans have regained interest in local football. For example, 
CSL’s TV audience increased from 267 million people in 2014 to 400 million people in 
2015, according to Wild East Football (Wild East Football, 2015). Thus, CSL TV 
viewership was higher than the English Premier League in China. Previously, the English 
Premier League was the football league the most watched in China with 350 million 
                                                
13 People that watched a game more than twenty consecutive minutes 
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people during the season 2014/2015 (Yutang Sports, 2015). Chinese football fans are 
also more interested in the national team’s performances. For example, the Chinese 
record of TV audience for a single football match was broken by a game of Team China. 
A total of 95 million viewers were recorded on various Chinese broadcasters for the 
quarterfinals of the AFC Asian Cup against Australia (ESPN Staff (A), 2015).  
 
4.3.2 Team China broadcasting and sponsorship revenue 
In 2015, broadcasting rights of Team China were acquired by Ti’ao Dongli, a sports 
broadcasting company under the umbrella of the state-backed company China Media 
Capital, for four years (Yutang Sports & O Diobhilin, 2016). Thus, broadcasting revenue 
amounted to 70 million Yuan (€ 9.5 million) the first year and is supposed to increase 
year by year until the end of the contract.  
The CFA decided to establish a standard partnership deal for Team China in 2015 
(Yutang Sports & O Diobhilin, 2016). Hence, the presenting partner must pay a minimum 
of 50 million Yuan (€ 6.8 million), official sponsors 20 million Yuan (€ 2.7 million), official 
suppliers 10 million Yuan (€ 1.4 million). When Yutang Sports and O Diobhilin published 
the article in May 2016, Team China relied on Changan Ford as the presenting partner, 
Nike, Yanjing Beer, Continental Tire, Gionee and Skyworth as the official sponsors, and 
China Ping An Insurance and Coca Cola as the official suppliers. Considering that Nike 
agreed to pay 100 million Yuan every year (€ 13.6 million), Team China should have 
received 250 million Yuan (€ 34 million) in 2016 from its sponsors (Yutang Sports & Sina, 
2015).  
Total Team China broadcasting and sponsorship revenue in 201614:  
320 million Yuan (€ 43.5 million) 
The amount earned by Team China in 2016 does not compete yet with the broadcasting 
and sponsorship revenue generated by each of the top five European football federations 
(Appendix 2, p.64). Indeed, the lowest amount was € 80 million generated by the Italian 
and Spanish football federations in 2015. Moreover, European national football teams 
played the UEFA EURO 2016 in France and this should have boosted their respective 
broadcasting and sponsorship revenue in 2016 compared to 2015. Notwithstanding, the 
broadcasting and sponsorship revenue presented above only takes into consideration 
the Chinese first national men’s football team revenue whereas other federations take 
                                                
14 Considering that broadcasting revenue has not changed since 2015 
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into consideration other sources of revenue, like other national teams (women and youth) 
as well as the revenue from their national cup for clubs. Notwithstanding, Team China 
already earned more than what all United States national football teams generated in 
term of broadcasting and sponsorship in 2016. Indeed, US national football teams 
gathered US$ 45 million (€ 40.7 million) from sponsorship, television, licensing, and 
royalties, which is € 3.5 million less than what the top-tier Chinese national men’s team 
alone generated from broadcasting and sponsorship (USSF, 2017).  
 
4.3.3 CSL broadcasting and sponsorship revenue 
CSL broadcasting rights fee has taken a new dimension since 2016 after that Ti’ao 
Dongli agreed to pay 8 billion Yuan (€ 1.1 billion) to acquire the CSL broadcasting rights 
during the next five years (Xinhua (C), 2016 & Ho, 2015). Thus, Ti’ao Dongli accepted to 
pay 1 billion Yuan (€ 136.1 million) the first two years and 2 billion Yuan (€ 272.2 million) 
the next three years. It is a risky bet taken by the company knowing that the CSL TV 
rights only accounted for 50 million Yuan (€ 6.8 million) in 2015 and the second highest 
bid represented half of the sum paid by Ti’ao Dongli (Clover, 2016).  
In addition, CSL received 520 million Yuan (€ 70.8 million) from its ten sponsors and 
suppliers in 2016 (Xinhua (C), 2016). The CSL title sponsor, Ping An Insurance, agreed 
to pay 170 million Yuan (€ 23.1 million) (Goal, 2014). The seven other main sponsors, 
Nike, Ford, JD.com, Carlsberg, DHL, and Red Bull, paid 250 million Yuan (€ 34 million) 
(Sports Sohu, 2016). Finally, the two official suppliers of the CSL, Shell and Tag Heuer, 
supported the league with 100 million Yuan (€ 13.6 million).  
Total CSL broadcasting and sponsorship revenue in 2016:  
1,520 million Yuan (€ 206.9 million) 
If sponsorship revenue does not change during the next years, the CSL broadcasting 
and sponsorship revenue will be worth 2.52 million Yuan (€ 342.9 million) between 2018 
and 2020 thanks to the deal with Ti’ao Dongli. Nonetheless, the question raised by Mr 
Wilson, founding editor of Wild East Football and quoted several times in articles related 
to Chinese football, is to know “how much of this TV rights money actually ends up with 
the clubs”, (Clover, 2016). 
The CSL revenue from broadcasting and sponsorship is still far below the ones from the 
top five European leagues (Appendix 1, p.64). Ligue 1, which is the league that earned 
the less from broadcasting and sponsorship among the top five European leagues, 
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generated € 935 million from these two components during the season 2014/15. Even 
the estimated CSL revenue from broadcasting and sponsorship between 2018 and 2020 
is € 592.1 million lower than Ligue 1’s revenue. However, compared to non-top five 
European leagues broadcasting and sponsorship revenues during the financial year 
2015, CSL is only below the Turkish, Russian, and Dutch football leagues (Appendix 10, 
p.69). Considering the estimated revenue between 2018 and 2020, the CSL revenue 
from sponsorship and broadcasting would even exceed the one from the Dutch league. 
Moreover, CSL already earns more from broadcasting and sponsorship than MLS, as 
the North American League generated about US$ 50 million (€ 45.2 million) from 
broadcasting and US$ 45 million (€ 40.7 million) from sponsorship in 2014 (Szymanski, 
2015). Even by adding the estimate revenue of US$ 48 million (€ 43.4 million) that MLS 
teams could generate with individual sponsoring, MLS revenue from broadcasting and 
sponsorship would still be € 77.6 million lower than the CSL revenue from broadcasting 
and sponsorship. 
 
4.3.4 Match day revenue  
Match day revenue is the third most important component of revenue in football. For 
example, it accounted for 17% of the top five European Leagues revenue in 2014/15 with 
a value of € 2.1 billion (Appendix 1, p.64). Within match day revenue, the major part 
comes from ticket sales therefore the next paragraphs focus on gate receipts revenue of 
the CSL and Team China.  
The CSL still has plenty of room to grow in this domain. Even though the average full 
capacity of CSL football stadiums is already higher than four of the top five European 
Leagues and the MLS average total stadium’s capacity, Chinese clubs struggled to fill 
their stadium in 2016 (Appendices 11 & 12, pp.69 & 70). Stadiums utilisation in CSL was 
at the same level than in Serie A with 52%. The worst example in CSL in terms of 
stadiums utilisation in 2016 was Hangzhou Greentown, which had a stadium capacity of 
51,000 seats but only welcomed an average of 11,723 supporters during the season, 
representing only 23% of the total stadium’s capacity (Transfermarkt, 2017). 
Notwithstanding, Chinese clubs could compensate their low attendance in stadium with 
a good ticket pricing strategy. For example, the EPL is the football league that generates 
the most revenue from match day as the league had on average the most expensive 
tickets and also the highest total attendance during the season 2014/15 (Appendix 13, 
p.71). Indeed, with ten games a day during thirty-eight match days, the total EPL 
attendance in 2014/15 was about 13,741,940 people. Even if Bundesliga had a higher 
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average attendance per game, the league only contains eighteen teams, which implies 
that the total attendance of the season 2014/15 was about 13,061,610 people. However, 
the high attendance per game in Bundesliga compensated the German league’s low 
average ticket price and therefore Bundesliga generated more revenue from match day 
than La Liga. In the opposite way, Serie A compensated its low attendance in stadiums 
with a higher average ticket price and earned more from match day than Ligue 1.  
The challenge in China is that, as Mr Bland and Mr Clover mentioned in The Financial 
Times, ticket prices remain still too low to generate a descent revenue from match day 
(Bland & Clover, 2016). The last data concerning ticket prices in CSL was published in 
2013 by Wild East Football (Bcheng, 2013). Taking the median between the highest and 
lowest season ticket prices as well as individual match ticket prices, a CSL season ticket 
in 2013 cost 542.7 Yuan (€ 73.9) and an individual match ticket 97.9 Yuan (€ 13.3) 
(Appendix 14, p.72). Knowing that there are thirty match days in a CSL season, the 
season ticket price per game was worth on average 18.1 Yuan (€ 2.5) in 2013. 
Calculating the average between the season ticket price per game and the individual 
match ticket price, a CSL ticket cost on average 58 Yuan (€ 7.9) in 2013. Thus, 
considering that the average ticket price for a CSL game has not changed since 2013, 
the CSL clubs’ cumulated revenue from gate receipts can be estimated. During a CSL 
season, eight matches are played during thirty match days, which means that 240 
matches are played during a CSL season. With an average of 24,162 spectators per 
game, the total CSL attendance in stadium in 2016 was about 5,798,880 people 
(Transfermarkt, 2017). This figure multiplied by the average ticket price per game gives: 
Total CSL match day revenue in 2016:  
336 million Yuan (€ 45.7 million) 
Compared to the top five European Leagues and MLS, CSL match day revenue is far 
from being competitive (Appendix 13, p.71). The second league with the lowest revenue 
from match day is MLS but the North American league match day revenue is still € 61.2 
million higher than the CSL one. Nonetheless, the CSL match day revenue only 
considers ticket sales and means that the figure displayed above is potentially higher 
when other sources of revenue from match day are added. 
Ticket sales is also an important revenue stream for national football teams. Indeed, the 
top-tier German national men’s football team alone generated € 7.2 million from tickets 
sales (DFB, 2016). The French football federation gathered € 20.1 million from ticket 
sales in 2015 with the majority of this amount coming from the first team (FFF, 2015). 
There is no data concerning how much Team China generates from ticket sales but 
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stadium attendance of the Chinese national football team can already be analysed. After 
the first seven games of the 2018 FIFA World Cup Russia qualifiers, the average 
attendance for Team China matches was about 41,102 people per game, which is almost 
the double of the 24,162 average attendance during the 2016 CSL season (Appendix 
15, p.73). However, on average, there were only 34,214 people in stadiums for the Team 
China home matches and 50,285 people for the away ones. Considering that there are 
on average 16,701 fans more in away games, it can be deducted that Team China is still 
struggling to attract local fans to watch the national team games in a stadium. In 
comparison, Iran, leader of the group after the first seven games, had a lower attendance 
average during the first seven games with 36,641 persons per game but had a much 
higher average attendance at home with 57,305 people per game (FIFA (C), 2017 & 
Goal, 2017). Thus, if Team China ticket prices are the same as for CSL games, gate 
receipts revenue of Team China should not be very high.  
 
4.3.5 Revenue of international competitions 
Football clubs and national teams can increase their revenue by participating in 
international competitions. Chinese football clubs performing well in the AFC Champions 
League, the most prestigious Asian cup for clubs, can benefit from a prize money 
increase that was concluded in 2016 (Appendix 16, p.74). The winners of the AFC 
Champions League earn henceforth a cumulated price revenue of US$ 3.4 million (€ 3.1 
million) compared to US$ 1.75 million (€ 1.6 million) in 2015. The AFC Champions 
League runners-up will also profit from the prize money increase as they now earn US$ 
1.5 million (€ 1.4 million) compared to US$ 750 thousand (€ 678 thousand) before. Thus, 
Shanghai SIPG and Shandon Luneng received US$ 200 thousand (€ 180.8 thousand) 
each for reaching the quarterfinals of the 2016 AFC Champions League (Soccer 24 (A), 
2017).   
Total International competitions revenue of CSL clubs in 2016:  
2.65 million Yuan (€ 360.6 thousand) 
AFC Champions League’s winners still earn eleven times less than their counterparts in 
Europe as the winners of the UEFA15 Champions League accumulate a revenue of 
€ 35.5 million from the round of 16 to the victory. This amount increases to € 57.2 million 
if prize money from the group stage of the competition is included16, which is eighteen 
                                                
15 Union of European Football Association, the highest governing body of European football 
16 Considering that the winners won all their group stage games 
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times more than what the AFC Champions League winners win. Nonetheless, the 
winning price of the AFC Champions League is the second highest amount for a top 
Confederation Cup for clubs together with the winning price of the CONMEBOL Copa 
Libertadores (Appendix 17, p.74).  
Chinese clubs playing the AFC Cup, the secondary Asian Confederation Cup for clubs, 
can also benefit from a prize money increase concluded in 2016 (Appendix 18, p.75). 
Thus, the winners of the AFC Cup will earn a cumulative revenue of US$ 1.08 million 
(€ 976.3 thousand) compared to only US$ 350 thousand (€ 316.4 thousand) before. 
Anew, this number is very low compared with the € 9.85 million earned by the winners 
of the secondary European Cup for clubs from the round of 16 to the victory. Moreover, 
adding the group stage prize money and considering that the winners win all their group 
matches, this number reaches € 15.71 million, which is sixteen times more than what the 
Asian winners will earn with the AFC Cup. In 2016, no Chinese football club benefited 
from the AFC Cup revenue as no one reached the round of 16 of the competition (Soccer 
24 (B), 2017). 
The Chinese national football team could also increase its revenue by participating in 
international competitions. Indeed, if Team China had participated at the 2014 FIFA 
World Cup, it would have added US$ 8 million (€ 7.2 million) to the national team revenue 
(Appendix 19, p.76). In addition, prize money is expected to rise again for the 2018 FIFA 
World Cup Russia (Appendix 20, p.76). Thus, a simple participation in the 2018 FIFA 
World Cup will add US$ 10 million (€ 9 million) to the Chinese national team revenue. 
However, national teams cannot earn the FIFA World Cup every year as the competition 
is only played every four years. Team China could compensate with a revenue from the 
Asian confederation cup but there is no prize money for the AFC Asian Cup for the 
moment (Fox Sports, 2015). In comparison, the prize money of other confederation cups 
are listed below (UEFA (B), 2015, Rick, 2016, Akwei, 2016 & Ozanian 2015):  
• UEFA Euro 2016: € 301 million shared by twenty-four participants  
• CONMEBOL Copa America 2015: US$ 10 million (€ 9 million) shared by 
twelve first teams  
• CAF African Cup of Nations 2017: US$ 6 million (€ 5.4 million) shared by 
the two first teams 
• CONCACAF Gold Cup 2015: US$ 2.75 million (€ 2.5 million) shared by 
twelve first teams 
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4.3.6 Total revenue of CSL clubs 
There is no official report about the revenues of Chinese clubs but Forbes listed the top 
ten richest Chinese clubs in 2016 and mentioned their revenues. Thus, Guangzhou 
Evergrande Taobao led the list with a US$ 57 million (€ 51.5 million) revenue, which was 
US$ 20 million (€ 18.1 million) more than what Shanghai SIPG generated in 2016 
(Appendix 21, p.77). Liaoning Whowin, the last club of the list, made a US$ 14 million 
(€ 12.7 million) revenue in 2016. This amount is four times less than the revenue of 
Evergrande. Hence, the ten Chinese richest clubs generated a cumulated revenue of 
US$ 281 million (€ 254 million) and an average revenue of US$ 28.1 million (€ 25.4 
million) per club. In comparison, the average clubs revenue in 2014/15 of the EPL was 
€ 220 million, Bundesliga € 132.9 million, La Liga € 102.7 million, Serie A € 89.6 million, 
Ligue 1 € 70.9 million. These figures are all much higher than the average revenue of 
the ten richest Chinese clubs.  
However, some European leagues total revenue are boosted by few rich clubs. For 
example, by withdrawing the richest clubs found in Deloitte Football Money League 
2014/15 from their respective league, the average clubs revenue of the EPL would be 
€ 131.5 million, Bundesliga € 94.5 million, La Liga € 43.4 million, Serie A € 57.8 million, 
and Ligue 1 € 49.3 million (Appendix 22, p.78). Therefore, without considering the richest 
clubs, Guangzhou Evergrande Taobao total revenue in 2015 was already competitive in 
Ligue 1 as well as in La Liga.  
When Chinese clubs revenue are compared with the ones of Ligue 1, there are already 
five Chinese clubs that could be competitive in the French football league in term of 
revenue (Appendix 23, p.79). On the other side of the Atlantic, the ten richest MLS clubs 
generated a cumulated revenue of US$ 376 million (€ 339.9 million) and an average 
revenue of US$ 37.6 million (€ 34 million) in 2015 (Appendix 24, p.80). Accordingly, the 
CSL clubs cumulated revenue in 2015 was US$ 95 million (€ 85.9 million) lower than the 
MLS clubs cumulated revenue and, on average, a Chinese club revenue was US$ 9.5 
million (€ 8.6 million) lower than a MLS club. When CSL and MLS clubs are ranked 
together by revenue, only three Chinese clubs, Guangzhou Evergrande Taobao, 
Shanghai SIPG and Jiangsu Suning, are positioned in the first half of the table against 
seven American clubs (Appendix 25, p.81). 
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4.4 The cost structure of Chinese football 
4.4.1 CFA expenditure and costs 
The expenditure of the CFA in Chinese football development amounted to 462 million 
Yuan (€ 62.9 million) in 2016 and other costs to 86 million Yuan (€ 11.7 million) (Wanxia 
(B), 2017). Therefore: 
Total CFA expenditure and costs in 2016:  
548 million Yuan (€ 74.6 million) 
European football federations total expenditure and costs are all higher than the Chinese 
one. Indeed, the English Football Association total expenditure and costs accounted for 
£ 299 million (€ 366.1 million) in 2015, the German FA for € 224.6 million, the French FA 
for € 218.7, the Italian FA for € 149.5 million, and the US FA for US$ 109.8 million (€ 99.3 
million) in 2016 (The FA, 2015, DFB, 2016, FFF, 2015, FIGC & Deloitte, 2016, & USSF, 
2017).  
However, the CFA decided at the end of 2016 that the 2017 financial budget for football 
development in the country would be 670 million Yuan (€ 91.2 million), which is an 
increase of 45% compared with the 2016 total expenditure (Wanxia (B), 2017). In 
comparison, the English Football Association decided to allocate £ 117 million (€ 143.2 
million), out of its total expenditure to support football development within the national 
boundaries, which is € 52 million more than what the Chinese FA 2017 financial budget. 
Therefore, supposing that costs will not change in 2017, the CFA total expenditure and 
costs should reach 756 million Yuan (€ 102.9 million) next year and thus be closer to 
other national federations total expenditure and costs.  
The CFA 2017 financial budget for football development in the country was decided to 
be distributed in the following way (Wanxia (B), 2017). The biggest share, which amounts 
to 186 million Yuan (€ 25.3 million), is supposed to support football teams representing 
China. This was planned to pay for the organisation of training sessions, competitions 
and coaches’ wages as well. The other major part of this budget with 121 million Yuan 
(€ 16.5 million) should be used to back youth and women football training. The budget 
in 2016 for youth football training only amounted to 30 million Yuan (€ 4.1 million) (Yutang 
Sports & Sina, 2016). If decisions are respected, CFA expenditure for youth and women 
football development in 2017 will be close to what the US Football Federation allocated 
to youth national teams and player development in 2016, as the American Federation 
spent US$ 21.6 million (€ 19.5 million) in this field. The CFA decided to allocate 33 million 
Yuan (€ 4.5 million) for coach trainings and to hire experts, both domestic and foreign, 
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to raise football standards in the country. In addition, 88 million Yuan  
(€ 12 million) should be used to support major national competitions, with a part going to 
Chinese second- and third-tier leagues. The remaining 243 million Yuan (€ 33.1 million) 
was planned to finance for other expenses, like promotional fees, operational costs and 
investments in the National Football Training Centre. 
 
4.4.2 CSL players’ salaries 
Total players’ salaries of the 2016 CSL was worth about US$ 366.7 million (€ 331.5 
million) for 473 players, which makes an average annual salary of US$ 775,358 
(€ 700,928.4) per player (Sporting Intelligence, 2016).  
Total players’ salaries in CSL in 2016:  
2,440 million Yuan (€ 332.1 million) 
Spending on players’ salaries have surged in 2016 compared with the preceding years 
(Appendix 26, p.82). Indeed, even added together, 2013 and 2014 average annual 
salaries per player do not reach the average annual salary per player in 2016. 
Nonetheless, the 2016 CSL average annual wage per player was still lower than the 
ones in the top five European Leagues (Appendix 27, p.82). Indeed, a football player 
earned on average US$ 1.7 million (€ 1.5 million) in a club of the top five European 
Leagues in 2016/17, about 2.2 times more than in the CSL. On the other hand, the CSL 
average annual salary per player was already higher than the MLS one, as the latter only 
reached US$ 313,438 (€ 283,349.9) in 2016, and was also higher than the one in the 
Japanese League, as the average annual salary per player in the J-League was US$ 
211,880 (€ 191,540.8) the same year. In 2016, Shangdong Luneng was the Chinese 
club that paid on average the highest salary to its players with an average annual salary 
of about US$ 1.9 million (€ 1.7 million) (Appendix 28, p.83). There were only thirty-one 
football clubs worldwide that had a higher average annual salary per player than 
Shangdong Luneng that year (Sporting Intelligence, 2016).  
At the bottom of the CSL average annual salary per player ranking, Yanbian Funde was 
the club with the lowest figure with US$ 123,337 (€ 111,497.4) (Appendix 28, p.83). As 
a result, a player of Shandong Luneng earned on average 15.8 times more than a player 
of Yanbian Funde during the season 2016 (Appendix 29, p.84). The ratio between the 
highest paying club and the lowest one is clearly lower in the MLS and EPL with 
respectively 5.2 and 6.1. Nonetheless, the CSL ratio is far from the ones of Ligue 1 and 
La Liga, as they respectively reached 21.5 and 20.7.  
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Even though CSL salaries have been increasing for the last few years, the major part is 
paid to foreigners. Considering the eighteen highest paid football players in CSL in 2017, 
no one is from China (Appendix 30, p.85). Moreover, these eighteen players gathered a 
cumulated salary of € 232.5 million, which accounted for about 70.1% of CSL total 
salaries in 2016 (Sporting Intelligence, 2016). The CSL total salaries has probably 
increased again in 2017 as Carlos Tevez, Oscar, Alex Witsel and Ezequiel Lavezzi made 
their apparition in the CSL this year, amounting together to € 91.9 million in salary. The 
Chinese club paying the highest salaries is probably not Shandong Luneng anymore, as 
in the top eighteen highest paid players in CSL in 2017, only Graziano Pellè belongs to 
the club and costs € 15 million per year. In comparison, Shanghai SIPG must pay € 72.7 
million for its players in the top eighteen list and Shanghai Shenhua € 49.5 million, which 
is respectively more than four and three times than what Shandong Luneng must pay to 
Graziano Pellè. However, paying high wages for football superstars is not uncommon in 
the world of football as it is the main way to attract and retain good players. Thus, it is 
not surprising to see that the top five European Leagues are the ones spending the most 
on players’ wages. Indeed, the top five European Leagues wages represented 70% of 
all the European Leagues wages in 2015 (Appendix 31, p.86). Moreover, we can see a 
strong correlation between wages and performances as the top four teams of every top 
five European Leagues are the ones spending the most on wages in their respective 
league (Appendices 32 & 33, p.87). Thus, 48.4% of the total wages of the top five 
European Leagues came from the four first clubs of each league during the season 
2014/15. In addition, paying large amount of money for foreign football superstars is also 
not uncommon in the world of football. Indeed, among the twenty highest paid football 
players worldwide, only one player, Wayne Rooney, is paid by a club of the same 
nationality (Appendix 34, p.88). In this top twenty list, Chinese clubs are the ones paying 
the most their players with a total annual salary of € 179.2 million, representing 47% of 
the total annual salary of the top twenty highest paid football players in the world 
(Appendix 35, p.89). Nonetheless, the CFA is now willing to stop the increase of salary 
paid to football players, notably foreign ones, by installing a salary cap (Knowlton, 2017). 
This decision came after that the government set off the alarm bells concerning the rise 
in football players’ salaries in the CSL, which questions again the independence of the 
CFA from the Chinese State. 
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4.4.3 CSL transfers 
In recent times, Chinese clubs have made headlines several times notably for the large 
sums of money they paid for foreign football players. Thus, (FIFA (E), 2017): 
Total CSL transfers net expenditure in 201617:  
2,930 million Yuan (€ 398.7 million) 
Considering only total expenditure on transfers, the amount spent by CSL clubs to 
purchase football players has increased from € 25.3 million in 2013 to € 408 million in 
2016, which represents a 1,512.6% increase (Appendix 36, p.89). In addition, from 2015 
to 2017, transfer fee record in China has been broken every year (Panja, 2015, Cantillon, 
2016, Church (B), 2016, Guardian Sport, 2016): 
• 2015: Ricardo Goulart - € 16 million 
• 2016: Hulk - € 55.8 million 
• 2017: Oscar - £ 52 million (€ 63.7 million) to £ 60 million (€ 73.5 million)18 
Transfer spending increased rapidly in 2016. Indeed, the transfer record was broken 
three times before the transfer of Hulk (Church (B), 2016). The transfer of Paulinho to 
China was worth £ 25 million (€ 30.6 million), the transfer of Jackson Martinez £ 31 million 
(€ 38 million) and the transfer of Alex Teixeira £ 38.4 million (€ 47 million). Therefore, it 
is not surprising to see a € 255.9 million increase in China total spending on transfers 
from 2015 to 2016 (Appendix 36, p.89). Hence, China was the fourth country worldwide 
spending the most on transfers of football players. In comparison, France and the USA 
spent respectively € 220.2 million and € 385.2 million less than China in 2016 (Appendix 
37, p.90). China could turn transfer costs into transfer receipts, as France and Spain did 
in 2016 with a respective positive result of € 222.5 million and € 41.4 million, but China 
total transfer receipts was still € 398.5 million lower than its total spending on transfers.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
17 Transfer net expenditure means the difference between transfer total spending and total receipts. This 
figure represents transfer expenditure of all Chinese clubs but as these sums are spent mostly for CSL 
players, this study considers China transfer expenditure to be the same as the CSL one. 
18 The exact amount is not known 
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4.5 Profit and loss statements of Chinese football 
4.5.1 CFA Profit and Loss statement  
Ruihua Certified Public Accountants, the company that audits CFA’s accounts, 
confirmed that the CFA total revenue was worth 764 million Yuan (€ 104 million) in 2016 
and total expenditure and costs 548 million Yuan (€ 74.6 million) (Wanxia (B), 2017). 
Hence, the CFA generated a 216 million Yuan (€ 29.4 million) profit before tax19. Some 
football federations, even though they are non-profit making organisations, generate a 
net profit at the end of a year mainly when they plan to spend more the following year for 
a particular reason. For example, the CFA projects to spend 45% more in 2017, meaning 
208 million Yuan (€ 28.3 million), to support the development of football in China. On the 
other hand, the association only forecasts an increase of 2% (16 million Yuan - € 2.2 
million) in revenue. In other terms, CFA’s operating profit in 2017 should amount to 
24 million Yuan (€ 3.3 million) if costs remain the same as in 2016. In comparison, the 
EFA made a £ 19.8 million (€ 24.2 million) operating profit in 2015, the DFB a € 6.8 
million operating profit, the FIGC a € 17.9 million operating profit, the FFF a € 10.5 million 
operating profit, the EFE a € 13.7 million operating profit and finally the USSF a US$ 15.5 
million (€ 14 million) operating profit in 2016 (The FA, 2015, DFB, 2016, FFF, 2015, FIGC 
& Deloitte, 2016, EFE, 2016, & USSF, 2017). 
 
4.5.2 CSL Profit and Loss statement  
The CSL made an operating loss before tax of 3,663.35 million Yuan (€ 498.5 million) in 
2016. However, generating a loss in football leagues is not an uncommon practice. It is 
shown in Appendix 6, p.66 that none of Ligue 1 and Serie A were profitable from 2010 
to 201520. Without the loss on transfers of players, the CSL loss accounted for 733.35 
million Yuan (€ 99.8 million) in 2016, which is already less important than the € 133 
million loss of Serie A in 2014/15. Moreover, when transfers of players and other external 
charges are included in the EPL, the British league only started to be profitable from the 
season 2013/14 (Appendix 38, p.90). The MLS clubs generated a combined annual loss 
before tax of US$ 146 million (€ 132 million) in 2014, without transfers of players 
(Szymanski, 2015). This amount is € 32.2 million higher than the 2016 CSL operating 
loss without transfers. 
                                                
19 Without depreciation, financial charges and taxes 
20 Without considering transfers of players 
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Figure 3 – CFA Profit and Loss statement 2016* 
Revenues:  
Team China broadcasting and 
sponsorship 
320 million Yuan 
(€ 43.5 million) 
Contribution from CSL** 152 million Yuan (€ 20.7 million) 
Other revenues 292 million Yuan (€ 39.7 million) 
Total revenues 764 million Yuan (€ 104 million)  
  
Expenses:  
CFA Expenditure 462 million Yuan (€ 62.9 million) 
CFA Costs 86 million Yuan  (€ 11.7 million) 
Total expenses 548 million Yuan  (€ 74.6 million) 
  
Profit / Loss Before tax:  
CFA Profit in 2016 216 million Yuan  (€ 29.4 million) 
*Based on the estimation provided previously this study.  
**10% of CSL broadcasting and sponsorship revenue (Xinhua (C), 2016) 
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Figure 4 – CSL Profit and Loss statement 2016* 
Revenues:  
Broadcasting and sponsorship 1,520 million Yuan (€ 206.9 million) 
Match day  336 million Yuan  (€ 45.7 million) 
International competitions  2.65 million Yuan  (€ 360.6 thousand) 
Total revenues 1,858.65 million Yuan (€ 252.9 million)  
  
Expenses:  
Contribution to CFA** 152 million Yuan (€ 20.7 million) 
Players’ salaries 2,440 million Yuan  (€ 332.1 million) 
Transfers  2,930 million Yuan  (€ 398.7 million) 
Total expenses 5,522 million Yuan  (€ 751.5 million) 
  
Profit / Loss Before tax: 
CSL Loss in 2016 3,663.35 million Yuan  (€ 498.5 million) 
*Based on the estimation provided previously in this study.  
**10% of CSL broadcasting and sponsorship revenue (Xinhua (C), 2016) 
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5. Opportunities and challenges in the development of 
football in China 
5.1 Introduction 
The Chinese government together with the CFA are trying to influence the growth of a 
football culture in China through different projects. During our interview, Mr Chadwick, 
Professor of Sports Enterprise & Co-Director of Centre for Sports Business at Salford 
University Manchester and quoted several times in articles related to Chinese football, 
said that he believes China has the potential to become a major player in football thanks 
to its “top-down and bottom-up investments, allied to a willingness to learn” (Appendix 
43, p.95). In addition, he mentioned that, compared to other countries that have tried to 
compete with the traditional football nations, China is rather different as the country is 
rich, centrally coordinated, and with a clear intent. In comparison, he said that USA was 
overly market-led, Qatar is too small, and Russia has too many issues to deal with.  
The development of football in China requires considerable financial investments and a 
single government, even the Chinese one, does not have the capacity to provide the 
necessary support. Thus, the involvement of private businesses in the Chinese football 
project is crucial. Mr Chadwick underlined that, under the Chinese communist regime, 
local companies are very likely to follow the State’s decisions and this is an advantage 
for football development in China (Sha, 2016). Indeed, many powerful Chinese 
businesses are already very committed to the realisation of Xi’s dream. Nonetheless, this 
wave of investments has been pushed by the Chinese government, which notably 
provides financial support to companies taking part in the national football project. The 
local government promises beneficial fiscal and financial regulations, land supply, 
favourable planning and tax reduction to companies that financially invest in the 
development of Chinese football (Xinhua (B), 2016). These benefits have been attractive 
especially for real estate companies. Thus, out of the nineteen companies owning stakes 
in a CSL club, eight are real estate companies (Appendix 7, p.67).  
At the end, what will really help the development of football in China is the performances 
of local teams on the field. The more competitive they will be, the more people will be 
interested to follow them and hence more revenue could be generated out of Chinese 
football. For that, what the CFA needs to do, which has been pointed out by many 
professionals who have an interest in Chinese football, is to develop a football culture in 
China. For example, there are still not enough Chinese children playing football in the 
streets (The Economist (A), 2016). Football played in the streets is where young children 
develop skills and creativity, which are both missing in China. In comparison, street 
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football is the trademark of Brazil and therefore the country has produced an enormous 
amount of skilful and creative football players, which led the country to be the only nation 
for the moment to have won the FIFA World Cup five times.  
This SWOT analysis presents the strengths and weaknesses of Chinese football and 
also the opportunities and challenges that may encourage or slow down the development 
of football in China. The main important points of this analysis are explained more 
precisely on the following pages. 
Figure 5 – SWOT analysis of Chinese football 
Strengths Weaknesses 
- Largest population in the world, already a 
large local football fan base even though 
football is not the most popular sport in the 
country 
- Relatively rich, ready to invest (heavily) in 
football 
- Supported by the Chinese government and 
businesses 
- Partnerships with strong football nations, 
clubs or specialists 
- Succeeded in attracting football stars that 
still had the level to play in the highest-level 
clubs 
- Experienced foreign coaches 
 
- No football culture 
- Lack of football knowledge 
- Bad image of football in China 
- Bets and match-fixing 
- Lack of space for children to play football  
- Lack of creativity 
- Oppressive government 
- Decision makers are not always the ones 
with the proper knowledge or background  
- Expenditures to please Xi Jinping 
- Foreign football players that are paid higher 
than what they are worth and do not perform 
well 
 
Opportunities Threats 
- Host and participate in a FIFA World Cup 
- New partners that have knowledge of 
football 
- Foreign businesses to sponsor Chinese 
football and clubs 
- More competitive teams in Asia in order to 
have more attractive continental cups for 
nations and clubs 
- Increase of attractiveness of international 
cups for clubs 
- Other countries that compete with 
traditional football nations that could become 
more attractive than China for football 
players 
- No more financial support from businesses 
because they do not generate the profit they 
expected 
- Money invested in Chinese football from 
crooks 
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5.2 Support from the Chinese government 
In its quest to develop football, China can count on a strong support: Mr Xi Jinping. 
Considered by Forbes as the fourth most powerful person in the world in 2016, Mr Jinping 
ascended to the presidency of China in 2012 (Forbes, 2017). The General Secretary of 
the communist party of China is known to be a fervent football fan and he is pushing 
people in his government to participate in the project of turning China into a “world 
football superpower” by 2050 (BBC, 2016). In 2015, Xi Jinping set up and ordered the 
Central reform leading group, China’s highest governmental decision-making body on 
sports matters, to define new reform plans that will boost the development of football in 
China (Meyer, 2015). The Central reform leading group came up in 2015 with a 50-point 
reform plan which was addressed to all people’s governments of provinces, autonomous 
regions, municipalities, all departments under the State Council and all subordinate 
institutions (Wilson, 2016). This plan was mainly divided into four different areas to be 
improved: domestic game, international success, social reform, and business 
opportunities (MacInnes, Baxter, Shaw Di-Doi, 2017). In 2016, they came up with a new 
plan with three clear targets: “clarifies the football pitch construction for per capita 
allotment, allows favourable financial and taxation policies to support football clubs and 
calls for football culture cultivation nationwide” (Xinhua (B), 2016). One of the main points 
of this plan is to have 0.5 to 0.7 pitch available for every 10,000 persons by 2020 and 
one pitch per 10,000 persons by 2030. It is also planned to have 20,000 football 
academies in China by the end of 2020 in order to have 30 million elementary school 
and middle school students playing the sport and subsequently a total 50 million people 
active in football. By 2025, the number of football academies in China could reach 50,000 
and potentially involve even more Chinese people in this sport (Wang, 2016).  
 Is China the new land of football? 
Nicolas Sliwowski 30 
5.3 Support from Chinese businesses 
5.3.1 Local investments 
In 2011, the real estate company Wanda Group, a conglomerate of commercial 
properties, culture, Internet and finance, decided to grant 500 million Yuan (€ 68 million) 
to the Chinese Football Association mainly to improve youth development and find a new 
coach for the national team (Zhe & Xiangfeng, 2011 & Wanda Group, 2017). A potential 
reason why the Wanda Group decided to make such a donation could be that the 
company was already investing in a field that the future president was willing to develop. 
Since then, many other companies have backed Chinese football. Local companies 
sponsoring the highest levels of Chinese football were displayed previously but some 
other companies have decided to provide support to lower levels of Chinese football, by 
taking over clubs for example.  
As mentioned before, the Evergrande Real Estate Group was the first big company that 
invested in a Chinese football club after the 2009 reform. Since then, many other 
companies have followed. Thus, three Chinese companies ranked in the 
Fortune Global 50021 list owned a Chinese club in 2016 (Fortune, 2016 & Appendix 7, 
p.67). These companies were CITIC Group #156 with US$ 55.9 billion revenue (€ 50.5 
billion), Greenland Holding Group #311 with US$ 33 billion revenue (€ 29.8 billion), and 
Evergrande Real Estate Group #496 with US$ 21.1 billion revenue (€ 19.1 billion). It is 
interesting to see that Alibaba, founded by the billionaire Jack Ma, decided to join forces 
with Evergrande Real Estate Group and bought 50% stake of Guangzhou Evergrande 
FC for 1.2 billion Yuan (€ 163.3 million) in 2014 (Clover, 2014). In 2016, the Wall Street 
Journal published a measurement based on a publication from the Beijing exchange that 
valued the club at US$ 3.4 billion (€ 3.1 billion), making it the most valuable club in the 
world (Jie, Areddy, & Xie, 2016). In 2017, the Chinese real estate company Sinobo Land 
acquired 64% of Beijing Guoan FC for US$ 514 million (€ 464.7 million), leaving the 34% 
remaining to the financial services company CITIC (SCMP, 2017). This purchase put the 
value of the freshly renamed Beijing Sinobo Guoan FC at US$ 807 million (€ 729.5 
million), according to the Hong Kong stock exchange, making the club more valuable 
than Atletico Madrid, Inter Milan, and many others according to KPMG’s football clubs’ 
valuation (KPMG, 2016).  
Clubs that allow their acquisition by a rich investor show the biggest revenue increase in 
a short period of time. Indeed, the rich investor can bring his personal funds and also 
                                                
21 This list ranks worldwide public companies per total revenue 
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attract more sponsors thanks to his network of contacts. So, it is not a surprise to see 
that Guangzhou Evergrande has the highest revenue in the CSL as the club was taken 
over by the two giants Evergrande Real Estate Group and Alibaba. In Europe, the two 
most representative recent examples of how a takeover by a rich investor can change 
the economic situation of a club are Manchester City FC (Man City) and Paris Saint-
Germain FC (PSG). The British club was taken over in August 2008 and PSG in June 
2011. Both clubs’ revenues were about five times higher in 2016 than their revenues 
before being taken over by the rich investor (Appendix 39, p.91). They were also 
respectively the fifth and sixth football clubs generating the most revenue in the world in 
2016 (Deloitte, 2017). Indeed, Man City and PSG were known to have generated a 
€ 524.9 million and € 520.9 million revenue respectively. 
Moreover, these takeovers have generally a positive impact on clubs’ results as well. 
The three clubs mentioned previously, Guangzhou Evergrande, Man City and PSG, have 
all positioned themselves among the best teams of their respective league after being 
taken over (Appendix 40, p.91). On top of that, Guangzhou Evergrande went from the 
second Chinese division to title holder of the Asian Champions League only three years 
after being taken over by the Chinese real estate company (The Economist, 2011 & Lee 
& Fort, 2015).    
Nonetheless, investments in a football club by rich people or companies have not always 
finished well. Football is filled with stories of clubs that went bankrupt even though they 
were directed by a rich investor or a group of investors. Taking as an example Servette 
FC and Neuchâtel Xamax, two long established Swiss football clubs, they were both 
acquired by a rich tycoon and then went bankrupt as well as relegated to the amateur 
league (Visentini, 2012 & Le Matin, 2012).  
In the CSL, companies do not hesitate to rename the club and change the logo in order 
to have the company’s name highlighted. Indeed, in 2016, fifteen of the sixteen CSL 
teams had the name of their parent company integrated into the club’s name 
(Appendix 7, p.67). The only club without the parent company name incorporated into 
the club’s name was Beijing Guoan but, after that Sinobo Group acquired stakes in the 
club, the team was renamed Beijing Sinobo Guoan FC (Transfermarkt, 2017). In 
addition, many clubs have changed their logos and colours mainly to be visually closer 
to the parent company. For example, eight very different logos, in terms of colour and 
form, can be found of Guangzhou Evergrande Taobao FC on Transfermarkt. Changing 
the club’s logo and colours for a business purpose is generally not well accepted by the 
fans of the club. The fans of Shanghai Shenhua already protested in 2014 against their 
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owner for having incorporated the company’s name into the club’s name and changed 
the logo of the club (Stanway, 2016). A European example of a similar issue would be 
Cardiff City. After being acquired by the Malaysian tycoon, Vincent Tan, the club was 
rebranded with a new logo and colours (South East Wales, 2014). These new funds 
brought by Mr Tan allowed the club to access the EPL in 2013/14 but the club finished 
last that season. Many Cardiff fans were very frustrated by this rebranding and protested 
against these changes. After being relegated to the second British division, the club 
changed again the team’s colours and logo in order to return to something more 
traditional.  
 
5.3.2 Investments abroad 
Chinese entrepreneurs do not only invest in Chinese clubs but also in foreign clubs. 
Acquisitions of foreign companies is a common practice in China when the government 
decides that Chinese businesses need to integrate a new industry. Indeed, in 2000, the 
Chinese government realised that local companies needed to be “globally competitive to 
survive” and acquire new knowledge in different industries (Williamson & Raman, 2011). 
Thus, the value of Chinese mergers and acquisitions increased from US$ 1.6 billion 
(€ 1.4 billion) in 2003 to US$ 18.2 billion (€ 16.5 billion) in 2006. Chinese investors have 
already acquired stakes in nineteen European clubs plus an Australian one for an 
estimated total amount of more than € 2.3 billion from 2014 to 2017 (Wanxia (A), 2017 
& Appendix 41, p.92). The last European club acquired by a Chinese investor was the 
legendary Italian club AC Milan (Fiore, 2017). The former Italian prime minister Mr Silvio 
Berlusconi, who owned 99.93% of the club through his family company Fininvest, agreed 
to sell all his shares for € 740 million. 
Notwithstanding the above, knowing that investing in a football club rarely generates 
direct profits, it is legitimate to wonder why Chinese entrepreneurs are willing to invest in 
European clubs. One of the main reasons is to acquire knowledge, as mentioned by Mr 
Chadwick during our interview (Appendix 43, p.95). Indeed, as China does not have a 
proper football know-how, the country is trying to find it abroad, like it does in the 
technology, R&D, or automotive industries for example (Williamson & Raman, 2011). For 
example, Mr Chadwick mentioned that “the Chinese government likes the Manchester 
City Model with the Etihad campus and so on” as the State along with its provincial 
authorities want to have similar sports campuses in all major Chinese cities (Gibson, 
2016). Therefore, CITIC Capital and China Media Capital acquired stakes in Manchester 
City. Moreover, these investments overseas will be helpful for the Chinese football 
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development as there are agreements with clubs to allow more player exchanges, 
develop youth training and also give a better opportunity to young Chinese football 
players to be coached in Europe. For example, the chairmen of Suning and Wanda 
Group, which respectively bought stakes in Inter Milan and Atletico Madrid, announced 
that both clubs’ academy were going to welcome young Chinese players (Sha, 2016). 
Chinese entrepreneurs have taken advantage of the fact that many European football 
clubs were undervalued and badly needed cash injections due to their bad economic 
situations (Sha, 2016). On top of that, some of these Chinese investors may even have 
received direct pressure form the local government to invest in football. For example, the 
chairman of the Fosun group, Guo Guangchang, was under investigation in 2015 for 
unclear reasons22 before being released without any charge. Seven months after the 
incident, he took over the English club Wolverhampton Wanderers FC (The Economist 
(B), 2016, BBC, 2015 & Mitchell, 2016).  
At the beginning of 2016, the Chinese company Ledman signed a deal with the 
Portuguese league (LPFP) to financially support the entire Portuguese second league, 
freshly renamed Ledman LigaPro (Porteous (B), 2016). This deal could have been very 
beneficial for Chinese football coaches and players as it was stipulated in the contract 
that each club needed three Chinese assistant coaches and the top ten clubs of the 
league must have at least one Chinese player in the squad. However, this clause was 
modified after protests were made against such imposing rules, notably by the president 
of the Portuguese professional footballer’s union, Joaquim Evengelista.  
The Chinese investors also want to expand the importance of China at the highest levels 
of the world of football. Therefore, Chinese investors have acquired stakes in marketing 
companies or firms that have broadcasting and organisation rights for football 
tournaments (Sha, 2016). For example, Wanda Group acquired Infront Sports & Media, 
a major partner of FIFA, for US$ 1.2 million (€ 1.1 million) in 2015. This acquisition could 
be strategic to help China host international sports events, such as the FIFA World Cup. 
It also allowed Mr Wand, Wanda’s chairman, to take a seat at the front row at FIFA’s 
year-end-meeting. He commented: “I was in the middle of the first row, the presidents of 
football associations of the other continents all sat behind me. Had we not acquired 
Infront, we would not be able to attend the FIFA meeting or receive their respect.” (Sha, 
2016).  
                                                
22 Apparently linked with corruption cases 
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The Chinese clean energy company Yingli decided to sponsor both the 2010 and 2014 
FIFA World Cups (Ghoshal, 2014). Yingli’s chairman Liansheng Miao confessed that the 
company’s brand awareness as well as demand for the company’s products soared 
thanks to the sponsorship of the 2010 FIFA World Cup. The white goods and electronics 
manufacturer Hisense provided € 50 million to sponsor the UEFA EURO 2016 in France. 
Following this deal, Ding Minghao, the vice-president of the Chinese leading sports 
marketing company Shankai Sports International, which helped Hisense with the UEFA 
EURO deal and with the related promotion campaign, said that this is a perfect shortcut 
for Chinese firms to be known worldwide. He even estimated that “Hisense saved five to 
eight years’ times in terms of popularisation in overseas markets” thanks to this 
sponsorship (Sha, 2016). In 2016, Guy-Laurent Epstein, UEFA’s head of marketing, 
admitted that he was hoping a Chinese company would sponsor the UEFA Champions 
League for the first time soon (Panja, 2016). 
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5.4 Partnerships 
The CFA already concluded partnerships with top football nations to develop the sport 
locally. In 2009, the Chinese Ministry of Education and the CFA started a partnership 
with the British Council and the English Premier League with the aim of developing 
football in China through the Premier Skills program (British Council, 2013). From 2009 
until 2013, the program provided training for over six hundred physical education 
teachers in more than five hundred schools located in nine cities. In 2013, the Premier 
League together with the British Council renewed their contracts with the Chinese 
Ministry of Education and the CFA to continue forming football teachers in China. The 
aim of this program was also to train more than two hundred referees by 2016.  
The CFA succeeded in creating a partnership with the Belgium Football Association in 
2016 (GB Times, 2016). The agreement included a collaboration of the two football 
associations on different levels, visits, trainer development and national friendly games 
of various age groups. At the end of 2016, the Chinese Football Association also signed 
an agreement with the German Football Association to support Chinese football 
development notably by sending local coaches to teach football in Chinese schools (Jing, 
2016). This deal, which was personally negotiated by the President Xi Jinping with the 
German Chancellor Ms Angela Merkel, will in return allow an easier access for German 
companies to strategic Chinese football decision makers, which is a perfect opportunity 
for Bundesliga’s directors who are seeking to broadcast their league in China (Ahmed, 
2016).  
China also relies on football legends to promote Chinese football abroad. In 2013, David 
Beckham accepted the position of ambassador of Chinese football, promoting it both 
domestically and abroad. The British icon was replaced in 2016 by Pavel Nedved who 
was in turn replaced by the legend Diego Maradona in 2017 (SCMP, 2016 & Das, 2017). 
These ambassadors can use their fame to support China’s position in the world of 
football, as Zinedine Zidane did for Qatar for the 2022 FIFA World Cup bid (Gibson, 
2013). 
Some Chinese clubs also partnered with top European football clubs, like FC Barcelona, 
Real Madrid, AC Milan and Arsenal, to develop football academies in China (Jingxi, 
2017). More information about these partnerships is presented in the next section. 
Chinese clubs also seek to collaborate with football agents (Porteous (A), 2016). For 
example, at the beginning of 2016, the chairman of Alisports, an offshoot of Alibaba, met 
the player agent Jorge Mendes to discuss partnerships. Few weeks later, the surprising 
transfer of Jackson Martinez, who is Jorge Mendes’ client, to Guangzhou Evergrande 
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FC, partially owned by Alibaba, was concluded. This kind of collaboration is very strategic 
as Mr Mendes is a very powerful football agent with an extensive list of football players 
under his umbrella, including Cristiano Ronaldo. 
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5.5 Competitiveness of the CSL  
5.5.1 Introduction 
As mentioned before, what will really help boost the Chinese football business model is 
the performances of Chinese teams on the field. In order to have competitive teams, 
China basically needs good players managed by good coaches. In football, players and 
coaches are selected in the national team based on their performances with clubs. 
Therefore, this subsection only focuses on the competitiveness of the CSL. Chinese 
clubs would prefer to have local football stars, however, as producing football stars is not 
something that happens overnight, CSL clubs have purchased foreign players and 
coaches in order to increase the quality of the local league.  
 
5.5.2 Foreign players 
The first surprising transfer was in 2011 with the arrival of the Argentinian Darío Conca 
in Guangzhou Evergrande FC (Church (B), 2016). On top of having broken the Chinese 
transfer record, Conca was also known to be the third-highest paid football player in the 
world at that time. In 2012, Shanghai Shenhua FC was able to count on two major 
recruits: Nicolas Anelka and Didier Drogba (BBC, 2012). The transfer of Didier Drogba 
was sensational because of his notoriety and also because he came to China 
immediately after having won the UEFA Champions League with Chelsea FC (PA, 2012). 
These arrivals created a lot of publicity for the Chinese Super League and more people 
in the world of football started to be interested in the country’s development in this sport.  
Until 2015, other famous football players at the end of their career entered the CSL but 
nobody as sensational as Didier Drogba (Transfermarkt (A), 2017). Generally, top 
football stars approaching the end of their career preferred to go to the USA or Qatar in 
order to enjoy a pre-retirement. In addition, there were financial issues in the CSL during 
these years. Indeed, many players, like Didier Drogba and Nicolas Anelka, did not stay 
in China for long and even left before the end of their contracts (Transfermarkt, 2017). 
For example, Didier Drogba left Shanghai Shenhua FC after only six months when 
actually he should have stayed for two years more (Ramzy, 2013). Apparently, the 
reason was that his wages were not paid. This strange phenomenon could indicate that 
inappropriate management and business behaviours were not completely wiped out from 
the CSL. Nonetheless, CSL achieved two important goals, which were to attract attention 
on the local league and to show the world that Chinese were determined to develop 
football in their country.  
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In 2015, China took a further step compared to other countries that are also trying to 
compete with traditional football nations, like the USA or Qatar for example. Indeed, a 
wave of promising football players under thirty years old arrived in China. It is something 
to underline because normally players that have enjoyed a promising football career in 
Europe only leave the old continent when they are near to the retirement. Thus, with the 
arrivals of players who could still play several years at the highest level in Europe, like 
the Colombian Jackson Martinez or the Brazilians Paulinho and Ramires, the Chinese 
Super League sent a strong message to the rest of the football world (Transfermarkt, 
2017). The league clearly showed that Chinese wanted to bring football in their country 
and, more importantly, that they have the necessary financial resources to do that. In 
addition, Chinese football clubs seem to have stabilised the situation with foreign players 
and keep them for a longer period. For example, Paulinho stated during an interview with 
Globesporte that he was willing to stay in China and that he even renewed his contract 
with Guangzhou Evergrande Taobao FC until 2020 (Natan, 2017).  
The deal which probably confirmed that China should be considered as a serious player 
in the world of football was the purchase of Alex Teixeira by Jiangsu Suning FC (BBC 
Sport, 2016). The Brazilian previously played for the Ukrainian club FC Shakhtar Donetsk 
and his performances notably attracted the interest of Liverpool FC. The British club 
attempted to buy the player before being outbid by Jiangsu Suning FC.  
The only way that the CSL can attract good foreign players for the moment is by paying 
a large amount of money. Therefore, transfer fees and wages have rocketed in the CSL 
for the last few years, as shown previously. Nonetheless, the CFA would rather have 
only Chinese players in the league because foreign players will not directly help the 
country win the FIFA World Cup, which is the ultimate goal of Xi Jinping. Thus, in order 
to avoid having too many foreign players taking the places of local players in the local 
league, the CFA reduced the number of foreign players in the match day squad from four 
non-Chinese players plus one Asian player to only three non-Chinese players (BBC 
Sport, 2017).  
 
5.5.3 Local players 
Wu lei and Zhang Linpeng are considered to be the best Chinese players but, according 
to Mr Wilson, neither of them have the level to play in Europe (Appendix 44, p.97). Thus, 
China has still a lot of room to improve concerning the generation of football stars. It was 
mentioned before that the Chinese Football Association together with the national 
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government were ready to financially support football youth development and that the 
CFA has partnered with many other nations’ football associations for this project. On top 
of that, China can also rely on an important support for youth development in football. 
Indeed, Tom Byer, who became popular for having revolutionised football youth 
development in Japan, accepted to be part of the China Schools Football (CSF) project, 
which aims at teaching football to very young children in China (Porteous (C), 2016). 
Thanks to this program, football is now taught as a mandatory physical education 
discipline in some Chinese schools. The idea of this project is also to help boost the 
football culture and enlarge the player pool, which both are still missing in China (Church 
(A), 2016 & Interview).  
Chinese clubs have understood the importance of generating football stars therefore 
some of them have already invested in brand new youth academies. Guangzhou 
Evergrande Taobao FC in collaboration with Xu Jiayin, considered as one of the most 
important Chinese property magnates, opened in 2012 the largest youth academy in the 
world in term of size (Stayton, 2016 & Sevastopulo, 2014). The academy was built in 
only ten months for a cost of US$ 185 million (€ 167.2 million). It includes fifty football 
pitches spread over about 675,825 m2 as well as basketball, tennis, and volleyball fields, 
a swimming pool, a gym, a library, a cinema, and six canteens. The academy can 
welcome 2,800 students, 2,600 boys and 200 girls. In order to ensure the best quality of 
training, the academy already had in its ranks twenty-four coaches from Real Madrid 
(twenty-two Spanish, plus one Argentinian and one Portuguese), which were part of a 
multimillion-euro deal with the Spanish club.  
More recently, Mission Hills Group, specialised in the hospitality, sports and leisure 
industry, has teamed up with FC Barcelona to build a US$ 8.5 million (€ 7.7 million) 
football academy in Haikou on the island of Hainan (Jingxi, 2017 & Phillips, 2017). This 
academy has seven pitches and will welcome about a thousand students, boys and girls, 
from six to eighteen years old. The Haikou academy will also welcome coaching staffs 
of FC Barcelona and provide the same quality of coaching as in La Masia23, which is 
extremely interesting for the Chinese academy as it is the first time that FC Barcelona 
will send its own staff to a foreign academy (Jingxi, 2017 & Phillips, 2017). The president 
of FC Barcelona Mr Josep Maria Bartomeu also noted that this partnership is special as 
it is “a long-term project that will last for ten years, even twenty years, which is a big 
difference from other football academies in China" (Jingxi, 2017).  
                                                
23 FC Barcelona’s training center where Lionel Messi was formed among other many talented football players  
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5.5.4 Coaches 
Neither the Chinese government or the CFA seem to have any problem about having 
foreign coaches managing the local teams. This probably comes from the fact that they 
have an indirect role and are less under the spotlight during the game. The other main 
reason is that Chinese are still looking to acquire football know-how. Hence, at the 
beginning of the 2017 CSL season, about 81% of the head coaches of CSL clubs were 
foreigners and 69% of them were originated from outside Asia. In comparison, 80% of 
the EPL coaches were foreigners at the 2016/2017 season kick-off (Transfermarkt, 
2017). Moreover, even the best football teams are coached by foreigners. Indeed, out of 
all the clubs who progressed to the round of 16 of the UEFA Champions League, nine 
clubs out of the sixteen were headed by a foreign coach (UEFA (A), 2017).  
Even the coach of Team China is not Chinese as the Italian Marcelo Lippi, winner of the 
2006 FIFA World Cup with Italy, was appointed as the head coach of Team China in 
2016 (SCMP staff reporter, 2016). It is also not uncommon in football to have a foreigner 
as the head coach of a national team. For example, during the 2014 FIFA World Cup in 
Brazil, fourteen national teams out of the thirty-two were headed by a foreign coach (Ran, 
2014). Nonetheless, Mr Wilson mentioned during our interview that China could not 
eternally rely on foreign coaches (Appendix 44, p.97). Indeed, the number of football 
facilities in China is expending and he said that at some point the country needs its own 
coaches. As shown previously, the CFA has also started to invest more in coach 
formation and ensures coach development with its partners. However, as for the players, 
it is very unlikely to see talented Chinese coaches emerging in the coming years, as the 
country has never had any good quality coach in its history. 
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6. Conclusion 
Considering the findings of this study, the Chinese football business model is comparable 
with the football business models of the other countries presented before. The year 2016 
was a lucrative year for the CFA and the association’s budget for 2017 is well distributed 
among the areas that need the most financial support to ensure a favourable 
development of football in China. The CSL realised a large loss in 2016 but it is not such 
a surprise considering that the league is still developing and that some other football 
leagues, even the top ones, generate losses as well. In addition, the governing members 
and leaders of Chinese football have a great willingness to learn and do not hesitate to 
react quickly to avoid misbehaviours. 
However, there is no certainty that China will become a football superpower or win the 
FIFA World Cup one day. From a business perspective, China’s success in football will 
depend on the country’s willingness to keep investing in this sport knowing that direct 
financial returns are not always guaranteed. As shown before, the largest financial 
investments were particularly made in CSL but Chinese people would probably benefit 
more if the CFA focuses more on youth development. Indeed, considering the example 
of England, there is no guarantee that the development of CSL will help Chinese football 
players to perform better. By focusing more on youth development, there is more chance 
that China will have better local football players and potentially have a competitive 
national team that could win the FIFA World Cup. Nonetheless, the results of these 
investments will probably start to be visible in about fifteen to twenty years. For example, 
it took about fifteen years for Belgium to be in the top ten of the FIFA ranking thanks to 
the local football youth development project.  
It is important that the Chinese government does not push too much this project because 
it could lead to bad investments and disappointment. Indeed, the objectives set by Xi 
Jinping and the CFA for the country to become a football superpower and win the FIFA 
World Cup are very high. Thus, Chinese investors are spending large sums of money 
but not all of them have the proper knowledge of football and there is a good chance that 
some of these investors will be duped.  
Football development in China will also depend on the collaboration between the 
Chinese government and local businesses. Indeed, both parties are the most important 
stakeholders in the Chinese football project but they are driven by different objectives, 
as mentioned before. Hence, both parties must find a common ground and pull in the 
same direction in order to achieve goals that will satisfy both of them as well as Chinese 
people.   
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One of the main challenges for the Chinese Football Association will be to develop a 
football culture in China. If it succeeds to do so, more Chinese people will be interested 
and involved in football and consequently there will be a greater probability that China 
will produce better football players. As for now, the CFA is supported by the Chinese 
government, local businesses and they are currently all investing in projects to spur the 
growth of this football culture. The CFA is willing to host a FIFA World Cup and this can 
definitively help strength the football culture in China. A FIFA World Cup is also a perfect 
way to inspire and unify people to support the country, which is wished by Xi Jinping.  
The CFA can assess the progression of the development of Chinese football with four 
steps to go through. First, China needs to generate its own local young football stars. 
When major European football teams or academies will try to recruit some Chinese 
young players that will be the signal that football youth development in China starts to be 
fruitful. Then, Chinese youth national teams need to impose themselves in international 
cups. This will mean that there is a potential for building up a strong first national team 
in the following years. After that, the Chinese first national team must impose itself as 
one of the best Asian nations. This can be accomplished by preforming well at the AFC 
Asian Cup, like by winning it. The last step is to see Team China performing well at the 
FIFA World Cup and possibly win it. If Chinese football succeeds to pass all these steps, 
Mr Xi Jinping and the CFA could consider calling China a football superpower. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: 
Source: Deloitte (A), 2016  
 
Appendix 2: 
Sources: EFE, 2016, FFF, 2015, The FA, 2015, FIGC & Deloitte, 2016 & DFB, 2016. 
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Appendix 3: 
Estimation of total wages distribution by league (in € million)* 
 EPL % La Liga % Serie A % Bundesliga % Ligue 1 % 
Total 
Wages 2,690.0 100.0 1,238 100.0 1,309 100.0 1,251 100.0 959 100.0 
Total 
players' 
salaries 
1,533.3 57.0 729.1 58.9 715.1 54.6 646.5 51.7 474.7 49.5 
Total 
personnel 
costs 
1,156.7 43.0 508.9 41.1 593.9 45.4 604.5 48.3 484.3 50.5 
Sources: UEFA (A), 2016 & Sporting Intelligence, 2016 
*Total wages correspond to the financial year 2015 and Total players’ salaries corresponds to the season 
2016/17. Total personnel costs is the difference between Total wages and Total players’ salaries.  
 
Appendix 4: 
Source: FIFA (D), 2017 
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Appendix 5:  
Source: FIFA (D), 2017 
 
Appendix 6: 
Source: Deloitte (A), 2016  
*Without players trade and exceptional items 
**No data available from 2010 to 2013 
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Appendix 7: 
Owners of Chinese football clubs in 2016 
Source: Nielsen, 2016 & Clover, 2014  
A. Beijing Guoan:  
CITIC Group (state investment) 
I. Jiangsu Suning:  
Suning Appliance Group (retailers, online retail) 
B. Changchun Yatai:  
Jilin Yatai Group (real estate, coal mining, 
securities) 
J. Liaoning Whowin:  
Liaoning Sport Technology College (Sports 
university) & Huludao Hongyun (real estate) 
C. Chongqing Lifan:  
Lifan Group (motorcycles, cars, spare parts) 
K. Shandong Luneng Taishan:  
Luneng Group (electric energy provider) 
D. Guangzhou Evergrande Taobao:  
Evergrande Real Estate Group, 50% (real estate) 
& Alibaba, 50% (E-commerce) 
L. Shanghai Greenland Shenhua:  
Greenland Group (developer) 
E. Guangzhou R&F:  
Guangzhou R&F (property developers) 
M. Shanghai SIPG:  
Shanghai International Port Group (port operator) 
F. Hangzhou Greentown:  
Greentown China Holdings Limited (real estate) 
N. Shijiazhuang Ever Bright:  
Hebel Ever Bright Real Estate Development Co. 
(real estate) 
G. Hebei China Fortune:  
China Fortune Land Development (real estate) 
O. Tianjin Teda:  
Tianjin TEDA Group (state-owned enterprise) 
H. Henan Jianye:  
Jianye Residential Group (real estate) 
P. Yanbian Funde:  
Yanbian Sports Bureau (sports) & Funder 
Holdings Group (insurance) 
 
A 
B 
C 
D E 
F I L M 
H K 
N O 
G 
J 
P 
 Is China the new land of football? 
Nicolas Sliwowski 68 
Appendix 8:  
Source: Kantar Sport, 2010 
 
Appendix 9: 
Source: Kantar Media, 2014 
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Appendix 10: 
Source: UEFA (A), 2015  
 
Appendix 11: 
Source: Deloitte (A), 2016 & Transfermarkt, 2017 
*The amounts for Bundesliga, Serie A, EPL, La Liga, Ligue 1 are from the season 2014/15 and the ones for 
CSL and MLS are from the season 2016 
** Some stadiums have higher capacity (for American football games) but reduced during MLS games 
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Appendix 12: 
Source: Deloitte (A), 2016 & Transfermarkt, 2017 
*The amounts for Bundesliga, Serie A, EPL, La Liga, Ligue 1 are from the season 2014/15 and the ones for 
CSL and MLS are from the season 2016 
** MLS stadium utilisation is much lower if actual stadium’s capacity is taken into account 
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Appendix 13: 
Clubs’ cumulated revenue from match days* 
League Total matches 
Average 
attendance/ 
game 
Total 
spectators 
(in million) 
Average 
ticket price 
(in €) 
Total match 
day revenue 
(in € million) 
EPL 380 36,163 13.7 56.1 768 
Bundesliga 306 42,685 13.1 39.8 521 
La Liga 380 25,734 9.8 44.4 435 
Serie A 380 21,586 8.2 25.6 210 
Ligue 1 380 22,329 8.5 19.4 165 
MLS 358 18,156 6.5 16.5 107 
CSL 240 24,162 5.8 7.9 46 
Sources: Deloitte (A), 2016 Szymanski, 2015 
* EPL, Bundesliga, La Liga, Serie A, Ligue 1: season 2014/15; MLS total spectators in 2016 with 2014 prices; 
CSL total spectators in 2016 with 2013 prices. MLS and CSL revenue only takes into consideration ticket 
sales. 
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Appendix 14: 
CSL 2013 ticket prices (in €)* 
Club 
Season tickets Individual matches 
Lowest Highest Median Lowest Highest Median 
Guangzhou 
Evergrande 81.7 176.9 129.3 9.5 27.2 18.4 
Jiangsu 
Sainty - - - 4.1 6.8 5.4 
Beijing 
Guoan 81.7 81.7 81.7 6.8 20.4 13.6 
Guizhou 
Renhe 65.3 65.3 65.3 6.8 6.8 6.8 
Dalien 
Aerbin 51.7 133.4 92.5 4.1 40.8 22.5 
Changchun 
Yatai 55.8 55.8 55.8 4.1 16.3 10.2 
Guangzhou 
R&F 24.5 51.7 38.1 5.4 8.2 6.8 
Shanghai 
Shenhua 68.0 68.0 68.0 10.9 27.2 19.1 
Liaoning 
Whowin 40.8 40.8 40.8 5.4 5.4 5.4 
Hangzhou 
Greentown 61.2 187.8 124.5 5.4 38.1 21.8 
Shandong 
Luneng 54.4 136.1 95.3 2.7 13.6 8.2 
Shanghai 
Shenxin 27.2 27.2 27.2 4.1 20.4 12.2 
Shanghai 
East Asia 68.0 68.0 68.0 4.1 51.7 27.9 
Wuhan Zall 49.0 98.0 73.5 5.4 10.9 8.2 
Average 56.1 91.6 73.9 5.6 21.0 13.3 
Source: Bcheng, 2013 
*CSL league is composed of 16 teams but only 14 were reported 
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Appendix 15: 
Sources: FIFA (C), 2017, Goal, 2017, Stadium Database, 2017, Emporis, 2017, Football Tripper, 2015, The 
Stadium Guide, 2017.  
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Appendix 16: 
AFC vs UEFA Champions League Prize Money Distribution 
Stage AFC 2015 Difference 
AFC 
2016 
UEFA* 
2016/17 
Round of 16 US$ 0.05m (€ 0.045m) x 1.6 
US$ 0.08m 
(€ 0.072m) € 6m 
Quarter-
finalists 
US$ 0.08m 
(€ 0.072m) x 1.5 
US$ 0.12m 
(€ 0.108m) € 6.5m 
Semi-finalists US$ 0.12m (€ 0.108m) x 1.67 
US$ 0.2m 
(€ 0.181m) € 7.5m 
Runners-up US$ 0.75m (€ 0.678m) x 2 
US$ 1.5m 
(€ 1.36m) € 11m 
Winners US$ 1.5m (€ 1.36m) x 2 
US$ 3m 
(€ 2.71m) € 15.5m 
Total received 
by the 
winners 
US$ 1.75m 
(€ 1.58m) x 1.94 
US$ 3.4m 
(€ 3.1m) € 35.5m  
Sources: AFC, 2016 & UEFA(A), 2016 
*There are also prize money for the group stage in the UEFA Champions League. The winners of the UEFA 
Champions League can potentially earn € 57.2m. 
 
Appendix 17:  
Sources: AFC, 2015, UEFA, 2016, Bein Sports, 2016, MLS, 2016 & Herman, 2016 
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Appendix 18: 
AFC vs UEFA secondary Confederation Cup for clubs Prize Money Distribution 
Stage AFC 2015 Difference 
AFC 
2016 
UEFA* 
2016/17 
Round of 16 / / US$ 0.015m (€ 0.014m) € 0.75m 
Quarter-
finalists / / 
US$ 0.025m 
(€ 0.023m) € 1m 
Semi-finalists / / US$ 0.04m (€ 0.036m) € 1.6m 
Runners-up US$ 0.25m (€ 0.23m) x 1.96 
US$ 0.5m 
(€ 0.45m) € 3.5m 
Winners US$ 0.35m (€ 0.32m) x 2.81 
US$ 1m 
(€ 0.9m) € 6.5m 
Total received 
by the 
winners 
US$ 0.35m 
(€ 0.32m) x 3.06 
US$ 1.08m 
(€ 0.98m) € 9.85m  
Sources: AFC, 2016 & UEFA (B), 2016 
*There are also prize money for the group stage in the UEFA Europa League. The winners of the UEFA 
Europa League can potentially earn € 15.71m 
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Appendix 19: 
Source: FIFA, 2015 
 
Appendix 20: 
Source: Gomez, 2016 
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Appendix 21: 
Chinese football clubs ranked by revenue in 2015  
(Position at the end of the season) 
1. Guangzhou Evergrande (1) US$ 57 million 
(€ 51.2 million)  
2. Shanghai SIPG (2) US$ 37 million 
(€ 33.4 million) 
3. Jiangsu Suning (9) US$ 36 million 
(€ 32.5 million) 
4. Beijing Guoan (4) US$ 30 million 
(€ 27.1 million) 
5. Shanghai Greenland Shenhua (6) US$ 29 million 
(€ 26.2 million) 
6. Shandong Luneng Taishan (3) US$ 24 million 
(€ 21.6 million) 
7. Hebei China Fortune (1, Div. 2) US$ 22 million 
(€ 19.9 million) 
8. Chongqing Lifan (8) US$ 17 million 
(€ 15.4 million) 
9. Tianjin Teda (13) US$ 15 million 
(€ 13.7 million) 
10. Liaoning Whowin (12) US$ 14 million 
(€ 12.7 million) 
Source: Klebnikov, 2016 & Transfermarkt, 2017 
 
 
 
 
 Is China the new land of football? 
Nicolas Sliwowski 78 
Appendix 22: 
Top five European League cumulated revenue distribution in 2014/15  
(in € million) 
League Total cumulated revenue 
Cumulated 
revenue from 
richest clubs* 
(number of clubs) 
Cumulated 
revenue from 
remaining clubs 
(number of clubs) 
EPL 4,400 2,822.2 (8) 1,577.8 (12) 
Bundesliga 2,392 974.3 (3) 1,417.7 (15) 
La Liga 2,053 1,314.4 (3) 738.6 (17) 
Serie A 1,792 866.9 (4) 925.1 (16) 
Ligue 1 1,418 480.8 (1) 937.2 (19) 
Source: Deloitte (A), 2016 & Deloitte, 2017 
*Richest clubs are the ones listed in Deloitte Football Money League 
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Appendix 23: 
Ligue 1 and CSL football clubs ranked by revenue in 2014/15  
1. Paris Saint-Germain* € 484 million 
2. Monaco € 117.4 million 
3. Olympique de Marseille € 109.7 million 
4. Olympique Lyonnais € 104.4 million 
5. LOSC € 72.1 million 
6. Saint-Etienne € 62.1 million 
7. Girondins de Bordeaux € 58.7 million 
8. Guangzhou Evergrande Taobao  € 51.2 million 
9. Stade Rennais  € 42.6 million 
10. Montpellier Hérault € 41 million 
11. OGC Nice € 37 million 
12. EA Guingamp € 36.6 million 
13. Nantes € 34.5 million 
14. Shanghai SIPG   € 33.4 million 
15. Jiangsu Suning  € 32.5 million 
16. Toulouse € 31.3 million 
17. Stade Malherbe Caen € 29.9 million 
18. Stade de Reims € 29.9 million 
19. Bastia € 27.7 million 
20. Evian Thonon Gaillard € 27.4 million 
21. Beijing Guoan € 27.1 million 
22. Metz € 26.2 million 
23. Shanghai Greenland Shenhua € 26.2 million 
24. Lens € 25.1 million 
Source: Klebnikov, 2016 & DNCG, 2016 
*PSG’s revenue in Deloitte report was € 480.8 million 
 Is China the new land of football? 
Nicolas Sliwowski 80 
Appendix 24: 
MLS football clubs ranked by revenue in 2015  
(Position at the end of the season) 
1. LA Galaxy  
(Playoff knockouts) 
US$ 58 million 
(€ 52.4 million)  
2. Seattle Sounders FC  
(Playoff Semi-finals) 
US$ 52 million 
(€ 47 million) 
3. Portland Timbers (1) US$ 39 million 
(€ 35.3 million) 
4. Toronto FC  
(Playoff knockouts) 
US$ 38 million 
(€ 34.4 million) 
5. New York City FC  
(8, Eastern) 
US$ 36 million 
(€ 32.5 million) 
6. Orlando City SC  
(7, Eastern) 
US$ 36 million 
(€ 32.5 million) 
7. Sporting Kansas City  
(Playoff knockouts) 
US$ 33 million 
(€ 29.8 million) 
8. San Jose Earthquakes  
(7, Western) 
US$ 31 million 
(€ 28 million) 
9. New England Revolution  
(Playoff knockouts) 
US$ 27 million 
(€ 24.4 million) 
10. Houston Dynamo  
(8, Western) 
US$ 26 million 
(€ 23.5 million) 
Source: Forbes Staff, 2016, Transfermarkt, 2017, ESPN Staff (B), 2015 
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Appendix 25: 
MLS and CSL football clubs ranked by revenue in 2015  
1. LA Galaxy  US$ 58 million (€ 52.4 million)  
2. Guangzhou Evergrande Taobao  US$ 57 million (€ 51.2 million)  
3. Seattle Sounders FC  US$ 52 million (€ 47 million) 
4. Portland Timbers  US$ 39 million (€ 35.3 million) 
5. Toronto FC  US$ 38 million (€ 34.4 million) 
6. Shanghai SIPG US$ 37 million (€ 33.4 million) 
7. Jiangsu Suning US$ 36 million (€ 32.5 million) 
8. New York City FC  US$ 36 million (€ 32.5 million) 
9. Orlando City SC  US$ 36 million (€ 32.5 million) 
10. Sporting Kansas City  US$ 33 million (€ 29.8 million) 
11. San Jose Earthquakes  US$ 31 million (€ 28 million) 
12. Beijing Guoan US$ 30 million (€ 27.1 million) 
13. Shanghai Greenland Shenhua US$ 29 million (€ 26.2 million) 
14. New England Revolution  US$ 27 million (€ 24.4 million) 
15. Houston Dynamo  US$ 26 million (€ 23.5 million) 
16. Shandong Luneng Taishan US$ 24 million (€ 21.6 million) 
17. Hebei China Fortune US$ 22 million (€ 19.9 million) 
18. Chongqing Lifan US$ 17 million (€ 15.4 million) 
19. Tianjin Teda US$ 15 million (€ 13.7 million) 
20. Liaoning Whowin US$ 14 million (€ 12.7 million) 
Source: Forbes Staff, 2016, Klebnikov, 2016, Transfermarkt, 2017, ESPN Staff (B), 2015 
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Appendix 26: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Sporting Intelligence, 2014 to 2016 
*Sporting Intelligence did not calculate 2015 CSL average annual salary per player 
 
Appendix 27: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Sporting Intelligence, 2016 
*Figures of CSL, MLS, J-League are of the year 2016 
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Appendix 28: 
Source: Sporting Intelligence, 2016 
Team Avg. Salary (US$) Avg. Salary (€) 
Shangdong Luneng 1,943,084.00 1,756,559.92 
Shanghai SIPG 1,896,633.00 1,714,567.93 
Jiangsu Suning 1,813,667.00 1,639,566.15 
Guangzhou Evergrande 1,803,846.00 1,630,687.91 
Hebei China Fortune 1,477,333.00 1,335,518.14 
Beijing Guoan 821,034.00 742,219.80 
Shanghai Shenhua 807,900.00 730,346.58 
Tianjin Teda 318,507.00 287,932.29 
Chongqing Lifan 271,250.00 245,211.67 
Henan Jianye 236,415.00 213,720.62 
Hangzhou Greentown 205,635.00 185,895.31 
Liaoning Whowin 199,570.00 180,412.51 
Guangzhou R&F 178,042.00 160,951.07 
Changchun Yatai 177,945.00 160,863.38 
Shijiazhuand Ever Bright 171,482.00 155,020.79 
Yanbian Funde 123,377.00 111,533.57 
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Appendix 29: 
Highest and lowest average annual salary per player by league in 2016/17* 
League 
Highest 
paying club 
Avg Annual 
Salary 
Lowest 
paying club 
Avg Annual 
Salary 
Ratio H/L 
EPL Man Utd 6,885,273 Burnley 1,138,894 6.1 
La Liga Barcelona 6,740,993 Leganes 324,992 20.7 
Ligue 1 PSG 5,342,154 Nancy 248,663 21.5 
Bundesliga 
Bayern 
Munich 
4,970,761 
SV Darmstadt 
98 
357,151 13.9 
Serie A Juventus 4,746,387 Crotone 370,029 12.8 
CSL 
Shangdong 
Luneng 
1,756,560 
Yanbian 
Funde 
111,534 15.8 
SPFL Celtic  856,614 Hamilton 50,840  16.9 
MLS 
New York City 
FC 
741,070 FC Dallas 142,922  5.2 
J-League 
Urawa Red 
Diamonds 
344,085 Ventforet Kofu 84,795 4.1 
Source: Sporting Intelligence, 2016 
*In green the highest number of the column and in red the lowest. 
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Appendix 30: 
Top 18 highest paid football players in CSL in 2017 (salary per year) 
1. Carlos Tevez (ARG) Shanghai Shenhua € 37,500,000 
2. Oscar (BRA) Shanghai SIPG € 24,400,000 
3. Hulk (BRA) Shanghai SIPG € 20,000,000 
4. Axel Witsel (BEL) Tianjin Quanjian € 16,000,000 
5. Graziano Pellè (ITA) Shandong Luneng € 15,000,000 
6. Asamoah Gyan (GHA) Shanghai SIPG € 14,800,000 
7. Ezequiel Lavezzi (ARG) Hebei China Fortune € 14,000,000 
8. Ramires (BRA) Jiangsu Suning € 13,000,000 
9. Jackson Martinez (COL) Guangzhou Evergrande € 12,500,000 
10. Alex Teixeira (BRA) Jiangsu Suning € 12,000,000 
11. Burak Yilmaz (TUR) Beijing Guoan € 8,000,000 
12. Dario Conca (ARG) Shanghai SIPG € 7,500,000 
13. Paulinho (BRA) Guangzhou Evergrande € 7,000,000 
14. Renato Augusto (BRA) Beijing Guoan € 6,500,000 
15. Stephane Mbia (CAM) Hebei China Fortune € 6,250,000 
16. Freddy Guarín (COL) Shanghai Shenhua € 6,200,000 
17. Elkeson (BRA) Shanghai SIPG € 6,000,000 
18. Obafemi Martins (NIG) Shanghai Shenhua € 5,800,000 
Source: Dias, 2017 
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Appendix 31: 
Source: UEFA (A), 2015. 
*In Europe, there are fifty-four leagues in total. In this graph, leagues are ranked by total wages expenditure. 
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Appendix 32: 
Average European clubss wages ranked by the final league position in the 
2014/15 (in € million) 
Ranks/Difference EPL La Liga Serie A Bundesliga Ligue 1 
1 to 4 269 202 155 146 128 
Difference - 125 - 153 - 86 - 72 - 81 
5 to 8 144 49 69 74 47 
Difference - 58 - 30 - 35 - 37 - 25 
Rest 86 19 34 37 22 
Source: UEFA (A), 2015. 
 
Appendix 33: 
Total European clubs’ wages ranked by the final league position in 2014/15  
(in € million) 
Ranks EPL % La Liga % Serie A % Bundesliga % Ligue 1 % 
1 to 4 1,076 40.1 808 65.6 620 47.5 584 46.7 512 53.1 
5 to 8 576 21.5 196 15.9 276 21.2 296 23.7 188 19.5 
Rest 1,032 38.5 228 18.5 408 31.3 370 29.6 264 27.4 
Total 2684 100.0 1232 100.0 1304 100.0 1250 100.0 964 100.0 
Source: UEFA (A), 2015. 
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Appendix 34: 
Top 20 highest paid football players worldwide in 2017 (salary per year) 
1. Cristiano Ronaldo (POR) Real Madrid (ESP) € 38,900,000 
2. Carlos Tevez (ARG) Shanghai Shenhua (CHN) € 37,500,000 
3. Lionel Messi (ARG) Barcelona (ESP) € 36,000,000 
4. Oscar (BRA) Shanghai SIPG (CHN) € 24,400,000 
5. Hulk (BRA) Shanghai SIPG (CHN) € 20,000,000 
6. Gareth Bale (WAL) Real Madrid (ESP) € 19,500,000 
7. Paul Pogba (FRA) Manchester United (ENG) € 17,700,000 
8. Neymar (BRA) Barcelona (ESP) € 17,600,000 
9. Axel Witsel (BEL) Tianjin Quanjian (CHN) € 16,000,000 
10. Wayne Rooney (ENG) Manchester United (ENG) € 15,800,000 
11. Pellè (ITA) Shangdong Luneng (CHN) € 15,000,000 
12. Asamoah Gyan (GHA) Shanghai SIPG (CHN) € 14,800,000 
13. Luis Suárez (URY) Barcelona (ESP) € 14,600,000 
14. Sergio Agüero (ARG) Manchester City (ENG) € 14,000,000 
15. Yaya Touré (CIV) Manchester City (ENG) € 14,000,000 
16. Ezequiel Lavezzi (ARG) Hebei China Fortune (CHN) € 14,000,000 
17. Zlatan Ibrahimović (SWE) Manchester United (ENG) € 13,400,000 
18. Ramires (BRA) Jiangsu Suning (CHN) € 13,000,000 
19. Jackson Martinez (COL) 
Guangzhou Evergrande 
(CHN) 
€ 12,500,000 
20. Alex Teixeira (BRA) Jiangsu Suning (CHN) € 12,000,000 
Source: Pereira, 2017 
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Appendix 35: 
Source: Pereira, 2017 
 
Appendix 36: 
Source: FIFA (E), 2017 
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Appendix 37: 
Net result of transfers by country in 2016 (in € million) 
 Total spending Total receipts Net result 
England 1,241.0 282.8 -958.2 
Germany 521.1 324.3 -196.8 
Spain 459.9 501.3 41.4 
Italy 459.7 439.5 -20.2 
China 408.0 9.5 -398.5 
France 187.8 410.2 222.5 
USA 22.8 14.6 -8.2 
Source: FIFA (F), 2017 
 
 
Appendix 38: 
Source: Deloitte (A), 2016  
*With players trade and exceptional items  
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Appendix 39: 
Source: Deloitte, 2009 to 2017 & DNCG, 2009 to 2011  
 
Appendix 40: 
Source: Transfermarkt, 2017  
*There is no data for Guangzhou Evergrande before 2008. The club was also relegated to the second 
division in 2010 
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Appendix 41: 
Non-Chinese clubs owned or partially owned by a Chinese investor in 2017* 
Source: Charlish & De Clercq, 2016, Wanxia (A), 2017, Fiore, 2017, TMT Post, 2016 & Pham, 2016 
*More information on the next page. 
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Club (Country, division) Investor Stake Deal value (in € million) 
A. AC Pavia (ITA, 3rd) Pingyi Shanghai Equity  100% 1 
B. ADO Den Haag (NED, 1st) United Vansen 100% 8.05 
C. Aston Villa (ENG, 2nd) Rui Kang Pharmaceutical 100% 77.74 
D. FC Sochaux-Montbéliard (FRA, 2nd) Ledus Lighting Technology Ltd 100% 7.22 
E. Lorca FC (ESP, 3rd) Shanghai Genbao 100% Not disclosed 
F. Newcastle Jets (AUS, 1st) Ledman Group 100% 3.32 
G. West Bromwich Albion (ENG, 1st) Yunyi Guokai Shanghai Sports  100% 207.92 
H. Wolverhampton Wanderers (ENG, 2nd) Fosun Group 100% 53.82 
I. AC Milan (ITA, 1st) Sino-Europe Sports 99.93% 740 
J. RCD Espanyol (ESP, 1st) Rastar Group 99.35% 103.96 
K. Granada CF (ESP, 1st) Desports Group 98.13% 183.23 
L. OGC Nice (FRA, 1st) Plateno Group & NewCity Capital 80% < 101.7 
M. SCU Torreense (POR, 3rd) Chen Qi 70% Not disclosed 
N. Inter Milan (ITA, 1st) Suning Commerce Group 69% 307 
O. SK Slavia Prague (CZR, 1st) CEFC China Enery Company 59.97% Not disclosed 
P. AJ Auxerre (FRA, 2nd) ORG Packaging Co 59.95% 7.02 
Q. Birmingham City (ENG, 2nd) Trillion Trophy Asia Ltd 50.6% 13.54 
R. Atlético Madrid (ESP, 1st) Wanda Group 20% 47.01 
S. Olympique Lyonnais (FRA, 1st) IDG Capital Partners 20% 100 
T. Manchester City (ENG, 1st) CITIC Capital & China Media Capital 13% 361.6 
Source: Charlish & De Clercq, 2016, Wanxia (A), 2017, Fiore, 2017, TMT Post, 2016 & Pham, 2016 
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Appendix 42: 
Interview with Mr Amanuel ABATE, independent consultant who has worked 
several times with the UEFA 
 
1. Do you believe that China can become a football superpower? If yes, why/how? 
It depends on what is meant by football superpower. Financially yes, given the high 
transfer fees and salaries being offered. But is this sustainable? In pure football terms, it 
takes a lot of years to build such a project.  Look at what Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Japan and 
South Korea have tried.   
  
2. How did the English Premier League become such an attractive league?   
The creation of the Premier League by a set of clubs saw the development of Pay-TV 
(Sky) and this in turn brought other broadcasting companies in the market. This raised 
the incomes for clubs through the last 20 years. Other footballer players got attracted 
and increased the international attraction on top of the already important international 
fan base due to the huge success of English clubs in Europe in the 60’s, 70’s, and early 
80’s. Moreover, the written press and access through Free-TV to highlights and the FA 
Cup helped to give a “free” or easy access to English football for fans at home and 
internationally. 
   
3. Is there a business model/strategy for a country to develop itself in football?  
I would rather say no, it takes a lot of years, resources, and motivation of people. 
  
4. Why companies are interested to invest in football clubs?  
A way of creating new relationships and improve the brand image by making it more 
“human”. 
  
5. Is there salary and transfer cap in Europe?  
No, not in Europe because of the EU Law – Freedom of movement of workers. 
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Appendix 43: 
Interview with Professor Simon CHADWICK, Professor of Sports Enterprise & 
Co-Director of Centre for Sports Business at Salford University Manchester. 
 
1. Do you think that China is using the right strategy to become a major player in 
football?  
Yes, I do. They combine top-down and bottom-up investments, allied to a willingness to 
learn.  
 
2. Some other countries that were historically not “football countries” (like USA, 
Qatar, Russia) have also tried to create a competitive football league but no one 
has succeeded to steal the limelight of the big five European football leagues, do 
you think that China has a better chance to set up a competitive football league?  
The USA was market-led, Qatar is too small, and Russia has too many issues to deal 
with. China is rather different: rich, centrally coordinated, with clear intent.  
 
3. Is there a possibility for China to create a competitive football league in which 
every club is profitable in order to avoid clubs cumulating debts like in some of 
the most famous European football clubs?  
This will be difficult, although China has shown that it has an appetite manipulating data 
(which would help in helping clubs to report a profit). 
 
4. Some Chinese clubs have paid huge amount of money for average/good foreign 
players, what can be the impacts on the development of Chinese football?  
It’s about learning. Chinese players can learn from some of the best in the world. It’s also 
about providing heroes and icons to boost fan engagement.  
 
5. Can Chinese football benefit from hosting a World Cup?  
Yes, of course. 
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6. Why does the English Premier League generate so much revenue compared to 
other football leagues?  
Mainly because of television revenues.  
 
7. Is there a strategy/model for a country that has never been successful in football 
to transform itself in a major player in this sport?  
Look at what France has done, or look at the English football association’s blueprint for 
the future of football. This recommended the creation of a premier league. Look where 
we are now.  
 
8. Does football leagues generally contribute to football federations’ revenue?  
Yes, of course.  
 
9. Are football federations/associations all non-for-profit?  
Yes, as far as I am aware. 
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Appendix 44: 
Interview with Mr Cameron WILSON, founding editor of Wild East Football. 
 
1. Why is football development such a priority for Xi Jinping? 
China has always been failing in football but has been very successful in other sectors. 
The country has been successful in economic growth and, in term of sports, in the 
Olympics. Football has become an embarrassment for China. The country believes that 
this sport can have a real positive impact on society. Football is a chance for people to 
exercise more and also can push children to do something else than study in their spare 
time, which is a national concern. China also lacks of creative people, notably due to the 
educational system that fails to produce creative people, therefore China relies on 
football, which is considerably based on creativity, to help the country to face this issue.   
 
2. Do you believe that China can become a football superpower? Has China a 
better chance than other countries that have also tried to compete with European 
football?  
Eventually but not soon. If it has to happen it will not be before 20 years or even longer.  
Football is becoming a more global sport. Before, it was highly centralised in Europe and 
South America. More recently, other countries have tried to compete with these two 
football poles but China is the only real challenger. China has notably attracted critics 
from European football because of the transfers they concluded. 
 
3. Who is the Chinese football star? How much does he earn per year? How much 
do Chinese players earn in average? 
Eventually Wu lei and Zhang Linpeng but they probably don’t have the level to play in 
Europe.  
There is no official data about Chinese players’ salaries. The only thing I can say is that 
it varies a lot but I really don’t know the exact amounts.  
 
 Is China the new land of football? 
Nicolas Sliwowski 98 
4. If Xi Jinping leaves the Chinese government in 2020, can it be a threat for 
Chinese football? 
Not necessarily because the outgoing Chinese President generally has lots of influence 
on the following one.  
 
5. Is the Chinese Football Association still linked to the Government?  
The CFA “officialised” its independence form the Government but everybody knows that 
it is not possible to have a proper independence from the State in China. Just look at the 
6 months ban that the Chinese player received or the transfer cap that was imposed on 
CSL clubs just before the season, that is absurd. Those decisions don’t come from the 
CFA, they can only come from people that don’t understand football. Those decisions 
come from above.  
 
6. Is there any financial report of the CSL, CFA, or Team China? 
Nothing official, China doesn’t really make those things public. Even if there were some 
reports, I would not believe it. 
 
7. Do you know the current ticket prices of a CSL or a national team game? 
No, I don’t have the official number but it has gone up since 2013. The season ticket for 
Shanghai Shenhua FC is about RMB 1500 this year and last year it was about RMB 
1000, if I remember well. 
 
8. Do you think that China will try to host the 2026 World Cup? What could be the 
advantages for China to host a World Cup? 
No, because it will come right after the World Cup in Qatar, which is in Asia, and the 
FIFA doesn’t allow to have two consecutive World cups in the same continent. 
It can definitely inspire people to follow the game. For example, a Champions League is 
more about money but a World Cup is really about football and can be more inspiring for 
people 
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9. Tom Byer, Rosselli on your website, and many other people mentioned that 
China must invest more in grassroots. The Chinese Football Association doubled 
grassroots funding for 2017, have you seen some improvements so far? If yes, 
can you give some examples? 
It is good that they want to invest more in grassroots and have more football pitches but 
the problem in China is not about how they invest, but more about the Chinese mentality 
in general. They lack of a football culture and people playing in the street.  
It is good to have more pitches but then where will they find coaches? They have 
welcomed many foreign coaches but China cannot fulfil the entire need of coaches with 
foreigners. The country needs to produce its own coaches. 
 
  
